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Environmental Federalism:
A Survey of the
Empirical Literature
Daniel L. Millimet †
Abstract
Generally, the debate over environmental federalism strongly
focuses on anecdotal evidence and intuition. Empirical facts have not
been the focus of arguments concerning the optimal allocation of
environmental authority. For example, the Tiebout model, which
highlights the positive side of decentralization as jurisdictions
efficiently compete for mobile residents, relies on seven assumptions.
Additionally, the group of models relying on the interjurisdictional
competition framework, which have highlighted both the positive and
negative outcomes of decentralized environmental authority, also rely
on a number of assumptions. This Article assesses the empirical
validity of many of these assumptions, concluding that the data may
necessitate a rethinking of these assumptions.
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Introduction
Professor Bednar defines federalism as a “system of government
characterized by semiautonomous states in a regime with a common
central government” where “governmental authority is allocated
between levels of government.”1 Professor Gordon notes that within a
federal system “each unit of government decides independently how
much of each type of public good to provide, and what types of taxes,
and which tax rates, to use in funding the public goods.”2 While many
countries contain a federal political system, the “optimal” allocation
of authority across levels of government is the subject of constant
research and debate.3 While much of this research and debate focuses
on fiscal policy (taxation and expenditures), the allocation of
authority over environmental decision making within a federal
political system has also been discussed, deliberated, and agonized
over for decades.4 The puzzle concerning the optimal allocation of
environmental authority across levels of government is commonly
referred to as environmental federalism.
Although the issue of environmental federalism receives
widespread attention across the globe, there is no resolution in sight.5
Even some of the most prominent researchers in this area have a
diverse set of beliefs. Professor Gordon concludes:
Competition among communities should lead to greater
efficiency and innovation. However, this paper has shown the
many ways in which decentralized decision-making can lead to
inefficiencies, since a local government will ignore the effects of
its decisions on the utility levels of nonresidents. . . . In light of
1.

Jenna Bednar, The Political Science of Federalism, 7 Ann. Rev. L. &
Soc. Sci. 269, 270 (2011).

2.

Roger H. Gordon, An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism,
98 Q.J. Econ. 567, 567 (1983).

3.

See Bednar, supra note 1, at 282 (“[C]oncern for the distribution of
authority will remain focal to the federalism literature.”).

4.

See Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism,
in Recent Advances in Environmental Economics 1, 1–32 (John
A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002).

5.

See Bednar, supra note 1, at 282 (“[A]s federalism theory continues to
develop, it may come back full circle to its original question: What is
the optimal distribution of authority between federal and state
governments?”).
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these costs arising from lack of coordination, it may be
preferable to have the central government take responsibility for
particular activities, in spite of the lost diversity.6

Professor Oates states: “My own sense is that where environmental
quality is basically a local public good, the case for the setting of
environmental standards at an appropriately decentralized level of
government is quite compelling. At the same time, one can envision
an essential informational and guidance role for the central
authority.”7 Professor Wilson concludes:
As such, competition among governments has both good and
bad aspects, the importance of which vary across the attributes
of the goods and services that the governments provide. This
assessment suggests a role for intervention by a central
authority, but both political considerations and information
problems should be carefully addressed.8

Professor Adler states: “In sum, there is a strong case for a general
presumption in favor of decentralization—a presumption that can be
overcome in any specific policy context by demonstrating the need for
federal intervention.”9 Professor Levinson writes: “The conclusion
must be that under most practical circumstances, local environmental
authority will lead to inefficient regulations.”10
The diversity of views concerning the appropriate allocation of
environmental authority also plays out in practice as different
federations have “resolved” the issue differently. For example, the
well-known Principle of Subsidiarity emanating from the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992 constitutionalizes the delegation of environmental
authority by dictating that centralized action is only allowed in
situations where policy objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved
through decentralized action.11 This is consistent with the so-called
Decentralization Theorem put forth by Professor Oates:

6.

Gordon, supra note 2, at 584–85.

7.

Oates, supra note 4, at 22–23.

8.

John Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 Nat’l Tax J.
269, 298 (1999).

9.

Jonathan H. Adler, Jursidictional Mismatch in
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 130, 138 (2005).

10.

Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report
and Some New Evidence, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 91, 103 (2003).

11.

Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons
for the European Union and the International Community, 83 Va. L.
Rev. 1331, 1340–41 (1997).
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[I]n the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of
a [local public] good and of interjurisdictional external effects,
the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically
higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption of the good are
provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.12

In contrast, the delegation of authority is not constitutionalized in the
United States except insofar as decentralized policymaking is not
allowed to interfere with interstate commerce.13 As a result,
environmental authority in the United States has oscillated between
periods of relatively greater centralized and decentralized control.14
Given this backdrop, the objectives of this article are twofold.
The first objective is to provide a very brief summary of the main
theoretical models put forth in the literature. The reason for doing so
is to illuminate the issues that play a fundamental role in conclusions
regarding the optimal allocation of environmental authority. The
second objective is to then provide a comprehensive survey of the
relevant empirical literatures for the first time in the legal literature.
By doing so, the goal is to limit the scope of the debate over
environmental federalism moving forward, as well as make clear where
the gaps in empirical knowledge exist.

I.

Environmental Federalism in Theory

The two primary theoretical frameworks used to explore the
effects of the decentralization of policy decisions such as taxes,
expenditures, environmental standards, etc. derive from Professor
Tiebout and the literature on interjurisdictional competition.15
The Tiebout model highlights the positive side of decentralization
as jurisdictions compete for mobile residents in such a way that yields
outcomes that are efficient.16 As laid out by Professor Revesz, the
12.

Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 54 (1972).

13.

See Revesz, supra note 11, at 1340 (“In the United States, the choice
between federal and state regulation (except when state regulation is
coupled with trade restrictions) is, for the most part, a matter of
policy.”).

14.

See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, & John C. Millian, Toward
a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental
Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 313 (1985); see also Levinson, supra note
10, at 96–97 (describing expenditures on environmental regulation and
monitoring by states and the federal government from 1972 to 1994).

15.

Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol.
Econ. 416, 416 (1956).

16.

See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J.
Econ. Literature 1120, 1124 (1999) (“In this model, highly mobile
households ‘vote with their feet’: they choose as a jurisdiction of
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model relies on “seven important assumptions.”17 First, individuals are
perfectly mobile across jurisdictions and have heterogeneous
preferences over jurisdictional attributes. Second, individuals have
perfect knowledge concerning the attributes of all jurisdictions, which
include the “head tax” levied on residents and the level of public
goods and services provided. Third, there exist a large number of
jurisdictions. Fourth, employment does not affect individual
residential choice as income is derived via dividends. Fifth, there are
no interjurisdictional externalities. Sixth, every jurisdiction has a
(known) optimal size where the average cost of services provided is
minimized. Seventh, jurisdictions below their optimal size seek to
attract new residents.18
Professor Brueckner provides a concise summary of the model:
Tiebout argued that, in attempting to attract residents, fiscally
autonomous subnational governments will tailor public spending
to suit individual preferences, leading consumers to sort across
jurisdictions according to their demand for public goods. With
each individual able to exactly fulfill his or her demand in some
jurisdiction, the economy achieves a market-like outcome in the
provision of public goods.19

Thus, under the assumptions of the model, this market-like outcome
is efficient.
In contrast, the interjurisdictional competition framework nests
both the positive and negative sides of decentralization as
jurisdictions compete for mobile resources, typically taken as capital.
Dating back at least to Oates’s 1972 model, the framework has led to
a variety of theoretical models.20 The 1988 model of Professors Oates
and Schwab provides a useful starting point in the literature.21

residence that locality that provides the fiscal package best suited to
their tastes. In the limiting case, the Tiebout solution does indeed
generate a first-best outcome that mimics the outcome in a competitive
market.”).
17.

Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1236 (1992).

18.

Id.

19.

Jan K. Brueckner, Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation:
Tiebout vs. Tax Competition, 11 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 133, 133
(2004).

20.

See generally Oates, supra note 12.

21.

Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. Pub.
Econ. 333 (1988).
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Oates and Schwab find that it is possible for decentralized
environmental authority to be efficient even with interjurisdictional
competition for capital.22 However, this result requires numerous
assumptions.23 First, individuals are homogeneous and immobile
across jurisdictions. Second, capital is perfectly mobile across
jurisdictions, seeking to maximize after-tax returns, and all
production profits are earned locally. Third, capital has perfect
knowledge concerning the attributes of all jurisdictions, which
includes the tax rate on capital and level of public goods and services
provided. Fourth, there exist a large number of jurisdictions that take
the after-tax return on capital as given. Fifth, there are no
interjurisdictional externalities. Sixth, governments maximize the
(known) social welfare of their jurisdiction. Oates summarizes this
model, stating that “the invisible hand works in much the same way
as in the private sector to channel policy decisions in individual
jurisdictions into an efficient outcome from a national perspective.”24
In sum, the Tiebout and interjurisdictional competition
frameworks provide a definitive answer to the environmental
federalism debate under certain assumptions. Failure of these
assumptions, however, may reverse this conclusion. For example,
Oates stresses the limitations of his earlier work, stating: “The
problem
is
that
these
models
make
some
strong
assumptions. . . . [V]iolations of any of these conditions can lead to
distorted outcomes.”25 Indeed, many theoretical models have extended
the Oates and Schwab model by relaxing various assumptions, finding
that
decentralized
environmental
policy
making
with
interjurisdictional competition may lead to environmental standards
that are inefficiently stringent or lax.26 Thus, the central takeaway
message from this lengthy theoretical literature is eloquently provided
by Oates:
The theoretical literature thus generates some diverse findings
on this issue. There seem to be some basic efficiency-enhancing
aspects of interjurisdictional competition, but there are clearly a

22.

Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Per G. Fredriksson, Regulatory Environmental
Federalism, 2 Ann. Rev. Resource Econ. 319, 321 (2010) (“In this
setup, it is not surprising that centralized environmental policy leads to
the first-best outcome for the whole federation. . . . Oates & Schwab’s
(1988) finding that decentralized policy leads to the first-best outcome is
perhaps more surprising.”).

23.

See Oates & Schwab, supra note 21, at 335–38.

24.

Oates, supra note 16, at 1135.

25.

Id. at 1136.

26.

See Dijkstra & Fredriksson, supra note 22, for an excellent survey of
this literature.
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range of “imperfections” that can be the source of allocative
distortions. The real issue here is the magnitude of these
distortions. Are we dealing with minor deviations from efficient
outcomes—or does such competition produce major welfare
losses? The pure theory can’t help us much in answering this
question.27

The debate, then, over environmental federalism cannot be settled
using theory alone. The range of possible theoretical outcomes can
only be limited by an empirical understanding of the magnitudes of
any violations of the various assumptions invoked in the Tiebout and
interjursidictional
competition
frameworks.
Surprisingly,
a
comprehensive review of what is known and unknown does not exist
to the Author’s knowledge. The result is that the debate over
environmental federalism focuses too much on anecdotal evidence and
intuition and not enough on empirical facts. The remainder of this
Article seeks to remedy this by assessing our current knowledge of the
imperfections alluded to above by Oates.
Prior to continuing, several comments are warranted. First, while
violation of any of the assumptions noted above may cause
decentralized environmental policy making to be inefficient, this does
not imply that centralized policy making is efficient (or even less
inefficient). Thus, interest lies in not just the validity of the prior
assumptions, but also the contrast in social welfare under local versus
central environmental authority because neither system is likely to
yield the efficient outcome in practice.28 Such differences, to the
extent possible, will be discussed in Part II.

27.

Oates, supra note 16, at 1136.

28.

The alternative to decentralized policy making need not be complete
centralization. A third option based on regional policy making may be
possible. See generally Oates, supra note 4, at 17–19 (“A systematic
study of such regional efforts that makes use of a sensible categorization
into typologies of environmental interaction (for example, unilateral
versus reciprocal pollution flows) and collective decision-making
institutions might well reveal what sorts of structures and policy
measures can work effectively for the regional management of
environmental quality.”); Terry Dinan & Natalie Tawil, Solving
Environmental Problems with Regional Decision-making: A Case Study
of Ground-Level Ozone, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 123, 123 (2003) (“Regional
decision making may offer solutions in cases where the problem is less
than national in scope, but clearly extends beyond individual state
boundaries.”); Adler, supra note 9, at 141 (“Such interstate spillovers
may constitute a regional problem, but this does not inherently justify
national regulation. In such cases, regional solutions, such as the
creation of regional entities or congressionally authorized interstate
compacts, may be in order.”). In the interests of limiting the scope of
the discussion, the distinction between regional and central policy
making is ignored.
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Second, neither environmental policy nor regulation are
homogeneous concepts. There are important sources of heterogeneity
across environmental issues (for example, air pollution, water
pollution, hazardous waste disposal, and energy), across stages of
environmental policy (for example, scientific research, standard
setting, measurement, and enforcement), and across environmental
instruments (for example, emissions taxes, cap-and-trade, subsidies,
and command-and-control policies). In all likelihood there is no single
answer to the question of optimal allocation of environmental
authority across levels of government. Differences may arise across
specific environmental issues or stages of the policy process. Moreover,
certain policy instruments may not be available to all levels of
governments. Such differences will also be emphasized when possible
in the remainder of this Article.
Finally, the quest to understand the optimal level of government
at which to assign environmental authority depends on, among other
things, one’s definition of optimal. Economists often equate optimality
with efficiency, which requires the equating of marginal social costs
and benefits in all locations. Others may wish to incorporate equity or
political considerations into the notion of optimality.29 Still others
may consider the optimal allocation of governmental authority as that
which maximizes environmental quality.30 As evidenced by the
theoretical discussion earlier in this Part, the structure of this Article
is guided by the factors affecting the efficiency of policymaking in
theoretical models. That said, the efficient outcome is generally
unknown, making the “first-best policy . . . . typically impracticable.”31 Thus, empirical evidence regarding the impact of local
versus central control is often expressed in terms of the level or
variance of environmental quality or the resulting nature of the
political process. Professor Adler reminds us, however, to bear in
mind that stricter regulation is not always efficient.32
29.

See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11
J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1997, at 43, 54 (“However one evaluates the
economic efficiency performance of federal constitutions, it must be
recognized that the federal institutions chosen will have important
implications for political participation and the protection of individual
rights and liberties, two other constitutional values central to past and
current federalism debates.”).

30.

Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal
Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
67, 71 (2007) (“[I]t is common to suggest that more environmental
regulation is better than less regulation . . . .”).

31.

H. Spencer Banzhaf & B. Andrew Chupp, Fiscal Federalism and
Interjurisdictional Externalities: New Results and an Application to US
Air Pollution, 96 J. Pub. Econ. 449, 449 (2012).

32.

See Adler, supra note 30, at 71 (“The optimal level of environmental
regulation in a given context may be greater than current levels, but it
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II. Environmental Federalism in Practice
This Part discusses the empirical literature relating to several of
the assumptions invoked in the Tiebout and interjursidictional
competition frameworks. First, in Part II.A, the empirical literature
on the mobility of capital and individuals is examined. Second, in
Part II.B, preference heterogeneity is assessed. Third, in Part II.C, the
importance of interjurisdictional externalities is evaluated. Fourth, in
Part II.D, political economy issues are examined. Finally, in Part II.E,
issues related to policy instruments are discussed.
A.

Resource Mobility

The Tiebout framework has as its linchpin the perfect mobility of
individuals.33 The interjurisdictional competition framework has its
linchpin the perfect mobility of capital.34 Here, I review the empirical
evidence on the mobility of these two resources, starting first with
individual mobility.
1.

Population Mobility

Efficiency in the Tiebout model is predicated upon the population
to be perfectly mobile across jurisdictions in order for individuals to
sort within communities that choose policies aligned with their
preferences. Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak write: “The notion that one
can pick up and move to a location that promises better opportunities
has long been an important part of the American mystique.”35 Clearly,
however, individuals are not perfectly mobile. Revesz states that
may also be lower if the costs of a given level of regulation exceed the
benefits.”).
33.

But see Oates, supra note 16, at 1124 (“In the limiting case, the Tiebout
solution does indeed generate a first-best outcome that mimics the
outcome in a competitive market. But the gains from decentralization,
although typically enhanced by such mobility, are by no means wholly
dependent upon them. In fact, if there were absolutely nothing mobile—
households, factors, or whatever—there would still exist, in general,
gains from decentralization. The point here is simply that even in the
absence of mobility, the efficient level of output of a ‘local’ public good,
as determined by the Samuelson condition that the sum of the marginal
rates of substitution equals marginal cost, will typically vary from one
jurisdiction to another.”).

34.

See Brueckner, supra note 19, at 133–34 (“In contrast to the Tiebout
tradition, the standard tax-competition model has immobile consumers
and no demand heterogeneity. . . . [C]ompeting subnational governments
pay for public goods with a tax on capital (i.e., business investment),
which is mobile across jurisdictions but fixed in total supply.”).

35.

Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith & Abigail Wozniak, Internal
Migration in the United States, 25 J. Econ. Persp., Summer 2011, at
173, 173.
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“much of the legal literature has dismissed as unrealistic the
assumption of perfect mobility by individuals. There may, indeed, be
substantial transaction costs in exiting one jurisdiction and moving to
another, particularly in a world in which individuals have jobs and do
not live solely on dividend income.”36 That said, how mobile are
individuals? And, does mobility differ across socioeconomic groups?
Evidence on residential mobility in the United States and other
countries in the 1970s and 1980s is presented by Long.37 Defining
mobility as simply changing residential address, he finds that the
United States has the second highest one-year residential mobility
rate at 17.5% (behind New Zealand) and the third highest five-year
residential mobility rate at 46.4% (behind Canada and Australia) in
the early 1980s among the handful of countries analyzed.38 However,
changing residences within a jurisdiction is not the type of mobility
envisioned in the Tiebout model. Upon further examination, Long
reports that roughly sixty percent of one-year and five-year residential
mobility is due to moves within the same county;39 roughly eighty
percent is due to moves within the same state.40 Thus, very little
internal migration crosses jurisdictional boundaries that might entail
significant changes in the provision of environmental quality.
Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak provide a more current, in-depth
analysis of internal migration in the United States. The crux of their
analysis points to an interesting puzzle: despite having one of the
highest rates of internal migration in the world, internal migration in
the United States has declined since roughly 1980.41 Specifically, five-

36.

See Revesz, supra note 17, at 1237.

37.

Larry Long, Residential Mobility Differences Among
Countries, 14 Int’l Regional Sci. Rev. 133 (1991).

38.

Id. at 136 tbl.1.

39.

See id. at 143 tbl.4 (indicating that, in 1980–81, 10.4% of the
population—or 60.4% of the moving population (17.2% of the total
population)—was attributed to moving within a county for the one-year
residential mobility interval and 25.1% of the population—or 54.0% of
the moving population (46.5% of the total population)—was attributed
to moving within a county for the five-year residential mobility
interval).

40.

See id. (indicating that, in 1980–81, 13.8% of the population—or 80.2%
of the moving population (17.2% of the total population)—was
attributed to moving within a county for the one-year residential
mobility interval and 34.9% of the population—or 75.1% of the moving
population (46.5% of the total population)—was attributed to moving
within a county for the five-year residential mobility interval).

41.

See Molloy, Smith & Wozniak, supra note 35, at 173–74 (“[I]nternal
U.S. migration seems to have reached an inflection point around
1980. . . . [T]he share of the population that had migrated between
states trended higher during much of the twentieth century, with the
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year, cross-state migration rates in the United States fell from 9.9% of
the population in 1980 to 8.9% in 2000.42 Five-year, cross-county
migration rates declined from 19.8% in 1980 to 18.6% in 2000.43
Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak state:
This decrease marks a noticeable departure from the longer-run
trend, as migration shows a secular rise from 1900 to
1990 . . . . Not only are migration rates lower in levels than at
any point in the post-war period, they have also entered a
period of continuous decline that is longer than any recorded in
the twentieth century.44

Beyond simply documenting rates of internal migration, several
studies have assessed the determinants of migration and destination
choice. Among different socioeconomic groups, the largest differences
in migration rates appear across education levels and homeownership
status. For example, Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak estimate the annual
interstate migration rate for individuals with at least a college degree
to be 2.1% over the period from 2001 to 2010 in comparison to only
1.2% for high school graduates and 1.0% for high school dropouts.45
Similarly, the migration rate for renters is 3.5%, but only 0.9% for
homeowners.46 Surprisingly, there is little difference in migration rates
by race or income status over this period.47
Several studies also investigate the role of economic factors on
migration decisions. Professors Barro and Sala-I-Martin document a
statistically significant, but small, effect of per capita income
differentials on interstate migration.48 Davies, Greenwood, and Li use
a different statistical technique and obtain larger effects. Specifically,
the authors find that one standard deviation increase in the ratio of
exception of the Great Depression. However, migration rates have been
falling in the past several decades . . . .”).
42.

Id. at 180 tbl.1.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 180–81 (citation omitted).

45.

Id. at 183 tbl.2.

46.

Id.

47.

See id. (finding a migration rate of 1.6% for individuals with an income
status in the top fifty percent in comparison to 1.7% for individuals with
an income status in the bottom fifty and finding a migration rate of
1.8% for white individuals in comparison to 1.7% for black individuals).

48.

Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Convergence Across States and
Regions, 1991 Brookings Papers Econ. Activity, no. 1, 1991, at
107, 132–33 (“Although the relation between the rate of in-migration
and lagged per capita income is positive and highly significant (holding
fixed our measure of amenities, population density, and some other
variables), the magnitude of the relation is small.”).
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the unemployment rate at a potential destination state to one’s
current state reduces the likelihood of migration to that destination
by about nineteen percent.49 Similarly, one standard deviation
increase in the ratio of per capita income at a potential destination
state to one’s current state increases the likelihood of migration to
that destination by about sixteen percent.50 Finally, Professors Borjas,
Bronars, and Trejo find that workers migrate to maximize their
relative standard of living. In particular, high-skilled workers move to
states where the return-to-skill rate is high (and, hence, income
inequality is greater), while low-skilled workers move to states where
the return-to-skill rate is low (and, hence, income inequality
is lower).51
To the Author’s knowledge, there is little empirical evidence on
the role of environmental quality in explaining internal migration
decisions. Barro and Sala-I-Martin explore interstate migration rates
in the United States from 1900 to 1987. To proxy for environmental
amenities, the authors include an independent variable measuring the
average number of days requiring heating. This is admittedly an
extremely crude proxy for environmental amenities. Nonetheless, the
authors find it to be a meaningful determinant of net migration rates
into particular states.52 Similarly, Professor Kahn explores the role of
smog—measured as days per year exceeding the Clean Air Act’s onehour standard for ozone—on county-level population growth in
California between 1980 and 1994. He finds that a county
experiencing a ten-day decline in the number of “high ozone” days

49.

See Paul S. Davies, Michael J. Greenwood & Haizheng Li, A
Conditional Logit Approach to U.S. State-to-State Migration, 41 J.
Regional Sci. 337, 350 (2001) (“[A] one-standard deviation change in
the destination-to-origin unemployment rate ratio reduces the
probability of migration between 18 percent and 20 percent . . . .”).

50.

See id. (“[A] one-standard deviation change in the destination-to-origin
per capita income ratio increases the probability of migration between
16 percent and 17 percent . . . .”).

51.

George J. Borjas, Stephen G. Bronars & Stephen J. Trejo, Self-Selection
and Internal Migration in the United States, 32 J. Urb. Econ. 159, 184
(1992) (“Individuals are more likely to migrate the greater is the
mismatch between their skill endowments and the returns paid to skills
in their native state. Moreover, the direction and skill composition of
internal migration flows seem to be guided by comparative advantage.
Skilled workers tend to move to states with greater wage dispersion than
their native state, whereas unskilled workers are more likely to move to
states with less dispersion.”).

52.

See Barro & Sala-I-Martin, supra note 48, at 132 (“These results
indicate that, all else being equal, people prefer warmer states.”).
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over this time period registered a nearly 7.8% increase in population
on average.53
Professors Banzhaf and Walsh undertake a detailed analysis using
more spatially disaggregate data than these prior studies.54 The
authors use data from California over the period from 1990 to 2000.
The authors divide urban areas of the state into mutually exclusive
half-mile diameter circles. They then assess the relationship that
changes in pollution have with changes in population and mean
household income over this period.55 Toxicity-weighted air emissions
from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) are used as the measure of
pollution. The results support the role of environmental amenities in
household location decisions. Specifically, locations with the average
level of emissions in 1990, as opposed to no emissions in 1990,
experienced about a twelve percent reduction in the population
growth rate between 1990 and 2000.56 The average location
experiencing an increase in emissions over the time period suffered a
6.9% reduction in the population growth rate.57 The average location
experiencing a decline in emissions witnessed a 6.3% increase in the
population growth rate.58
Lastly, Professor Konisky, in tangentially related research, finds
that better educated individuals are more likely to favor federal
53.

Matthew E. Kahn, Smog Reduction’s Impact on California County
Growth, 40 J. Regional Sci. 565, 570 (2000) (“A county that
experienced a 10-day reduction in high ozone days between 1980 and
1994 grew by 7.8 percent more than a county whose ozone level
remained unchanged.”).

54.

H. Spencer Banzhaf & Randall P. Walsh, Do People Vote with Their
Feet? An Empirical Test of Tiebout’s Mechanism, 98 Am. Econ. Rev.
843, 850 (2008) (“Census tracts may be too aggregate a unit . . . . For
these reasons, we take a different approach to neighborhood definitions.
We define neighborhoods as a set of half-mile-diameter circles . . . .”).

55.

See id. at 849 (“First, we identify a set of spatially delineated
communities. Second, we construct demographic composition measures
for each community for 1990 and 2000. Finally, for each community we
construct measures of the toxicity-weighted level of exposure to air
pollution in 1990 and 2000 based on data from the Toxics Release
Inventory of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).”).

56.

See id. at 858 (“Focusing on the percentage change model, on average,
baseline exposure to TRI emissions is associated with relative population
declines that range from 10 to 16 percent, depending on the model.”).

57.

See id. (“Likewise, the appearance of new toxic emissions in a previously
untreated neighborhood is associated with population declines between 5
and 9 percent.”).

58.

See id. (“Finally, the model predicts consistent responses in the opposite
direction for communities that lose exposure. On average, these
communities are predicted to experience population gains of 5 to 7
percent.”).
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control over most environmental issues, including local issues such as
protecting community drinking water.59 If the higher mobility rates of
the better educated documented by Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak are
related to environmental issues, one might expect the reverse to
be true.
In sum, labor mobility is relatively high in the United States
compared to many other developed countries, and there exists some
evidence that location decisions are impacted by environmental
amenities at a very spatially disaggregate level. But, mobility is on a
“historically unprecedented” downward trajectory in the United
States.60 Whether this low (and declining) mobility invalidates the
Tiebout assumption, or simply reflects a population close to
equilibrium where most individuals are currently residing in
communities that maximize their utility is not clear. Moreover,
whether the “threat” of migration exists and is sufficient to satisfy the
assumptions of the Tiebout model is equally unclear.61
However, three facts work against the Tiebout model. First,
migration patterns appear to be strongly related to employment, not
the provision of public goods. Second, the survey evidence provided in
Konisky indicates that more mobile segments of the population are
more likely to favor federal authority over even local environmental
issues. Finally, the fact that mobility rates are significantly lower for
the less educated runs the risk that jurisdictions do not compete for
residents of this type, but instead focus on the competition for more
mobile, educated residents. If so, the Tiebout model would predict
that the preferences of lower educated residents will be ignored.
Provision of even purely local goods, such as drinking water, may not
reflect the preferences of all residents. Bednar states: “If only a
categorical portion of the population is immobile—the poor or ethnic
minorities—then outcomes are even worse; governments compete for
the wealthiest and are free to ignore these minority categories.”62
59.

David Konisky, Public Preferences for Environmental Policy
Responsibility, 41 Publius: J. Federalism 76, 93 (2010) (“The
parameter estimates on the education variable range from about 0.15 to
0.40, which translates, on average, to a difference in the predicted
probability of an individual without a high school degree choosing the
federal government relative to someone with a post-graduate degree of
about 0.17.”).

60.

Molloy, Smith & Wozniak, supra note 35, at 194.

61.

The threat of migration is analogous to the notion of contestable
markets. In that case, a market with few firms may achieve the
competitive equilibrium if the threat of entry exists due to: (1) a lack of
entry and exit barriers; (2) no sunk costs; and (3) complete access to the
same technology by both incumbents and new entrants. See, e.g.,
William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of
Industry Structure, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 3–4 (1982).

62.

Bednar, supra note 1, at 274.

1682

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·201
Environmental Federalism
2.

Capital Mobility

The empirical literature on capital mobility is much more
extensive. Not only are there a number of studies assessing the impact
of taxation on the location of industrial activity, but there are many
studies focused solely on the impact of environmental regulation on
the location of industrial activity. In the interest of relative brevity,
this Article focuses solely on the latter and starts with the 1995
survey article by Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins.63 The authors
survey the literature at the time on the effects of the early period of
environmental regulation in the United States (post-1970) on countrylevel competitiveness.64 To measure competitiveness, the authors focus
on empirical studies examining trade patterns, both generally and
specifically in pollution-intensive industries, domestic firm location
decisions, and foreign direct investment (FDI).65 Jaffe, Peterson,
Portney, and Stavins summarize the literature, concluding:
Overall, there is relatively little evidence to support the
hypothesis that environmental regulations have had a large
adverse effect on competitiveness, however that elusive term is
defined. . . . [S]tudies attempting to measure the effect of
environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows,
and plant-location decisions have produced estimates that are
either small, statistically insignificant, or not robust to tests of
model specification.66

Surveying the literature at roughly the same time, Levinson similarly
notes that “the empirical literature suggests that . . . economic
activity does not respond significantly to the different taxes and
regulations in competing jurisdictions.”67
However, there are a number of statistical problems that plague
these early empirical studies. In their concluding remarks, Jaffe,
Peterson, Portney, and Stavins discuss the issue of measuring

63.

Adam B. Jaffe, Steven R. Peterson, Paul R. Portney & Robert N.
Stavins, Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. Econ.
Literature 132 (1995).

64.

See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a
“Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 Hastings L.J. 271 (1997)
(surveying the legal literature).

65.

See Jaffee, Peterson, Portney & Stavins, supra note 63, at 137.

66.

Id. at 157–58.

67.

Arik Levinson, NIMBY Taxes Matter: The Case of State Hazardous
Waste Disposal Taxes, 74 J. Pub. Econ. 31, 32 (1999).
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environmental stringency in practice.68 Environmental regulation is a
complex concept which does not lend itself to precise measurement.
Regulations differ across pollutants and depend not just on legislation
(de jure regulation) but also enforcement (de facto regulation).
Reliance on poor proxies for environmental regulation—referred to as
measurement error in the econometric literature—might explain the
lack of meaningful effects found in these early studies. A second
problem with this early literature is that the results lacked a
convincing causal interpretation. The authors note: “[T]he choice of a
new plant location is obviously a complex one. . . . Hence, isolating
the effect of environmental regulations on the decision will inevitably
be difficult.”69 In particular, the choice of environmental stringency in
a particular jurisdiction may be endogenous to the level (or expected
level) of economic activity, or may be correlated with other locationspecific attributes that determine the location of economic activity
but are unobserved by the researcher.
The empirical literature beginning in the late 1990s addresses
these criticisms. As noted by Professors Jeppesen, List, and Folmer,
this “second wave” of studies has consistently found meaningful,
detrimental effects of environmental regulation on industrial activity.70
Professors Brunnermeier and Levinson conclude:
The early literature based on cross-sectional analyses typically
tended to find that environmental regulations had an
insignificant effect on firm location decisions. However, several
recent studies that use panel data to control for unobserved
heterogeneity, or instruments to control for endogeneity, do find
statistically significant pollution haven effects of reasonable
magnitude. Furthermore, it does not appear to matter whether
these studies look across countries, industries, states, or
counties, or whether they examine plant location, investment, or
international trade patterns.71

68.

See Jaffee, Peterson, Portney & Stavins, supra note 63, at 158
(“[E]xisting data are severely limited in their ability to measure the
relative stringency of environmental regulation . . . .”).

69.

Id. at 146.

70.

Tim Jeppesen, John A. List & Henk Folmer, Environmental Regulations
and New Plant Location Decisions: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, 42
J. Regional Sci. 19, 23–24 (2002) (“Papers in the second research
wave . . . typically find much stronger evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that environmental regulations affect the allocation of new
firms.”).

71.

Smita B. Brunnermeier & Arik Levinson, Examining the Evidence on
Environmental Regulations and Industry Location, 13 J. Env’t & Dev.
6, 37–38 (2004).
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One branch of this second wave of studies uses the spatial and
temporal variation in U.S. county-level environmental regulation
induced by the Clean Air Act72 (CAA) to address the question of
capital mobility. Specifically, beginning in 1972, every U.S. county is
designated as either in attainment or out of attainment
(nonattainment) of the federally designated standard for each of the
criteria air pollutants established under the statute.73 Counties that
are in nonattainment are subject to more stringent regulation.74 Thus,
nonattainment status is synonymous with greater regulatory
stringency.
Professor Henderson uses data on the ozone attainment status of
urban counties over the period from 1977 to 1987, along with data on
the number of establishments in each county during each year from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns, to examine the
effects of the more stringent regulations imposed in nonattainment
counties.75 He focuses on five pollution-intensive manufacturing
industries: industrial organic chemicals, petroleum refining,
miscellaneous plastics, plastic materials and synthetics, and blast
furnace and primary steel. The results indicate that counties in
attainment over the prior three years contain seven to ten percent
more establishments than other counties.76
72.

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006).

73.

42 U.S.C. § 7407(c)–(d).

74.

See, e.g., Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental
Regulations on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977
Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110
Journal Pol. Econ. 1175, 1176–77 (“The Clean Air Act, originally
passed in 1963 and amended in 1970, 1977, and 1990, is one of the most
significant federal interventions into the market in the postwar period.
Following the passage of the 1970 amendments, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) established separate national ambient air
quality standards—a minimum level of air quality that all counties are
required to meet—for four criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO),
tropospheric ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and total suspended
particulates (TSPs). As a part of this legislation, every U.S. county
receives separate nonattainment or attainment designations for each of
the four pollutants annually. The nonattainment designation is reserved
for counties whose air contains concentrations of a pollutant that exceed
the relevant federal standard. Emitters of the regulated pollutant in
nonattainment counties are subject to stricter regulatory oversight than
emitters in attainment counties. Nonpolluters are free from regulation in
both categories of counties.”).

75.

See J. Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulation, 86 Am.
Econ. Rev. 789, 811 (1996).

76.

See id. at 802 (“In summary, a county being in nonattainment for heavy
volatile organic compound emitters discourages location there. A switch
to a clean ozone record increases the number of plants in the county by
about 8 percent.”).
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In a subsequent study, Professor Henderson revisits the same data
using a different statistical methodology and focusing on a binary
indicator of the presence of at least one of the pollution-intensive
establishments in a county during a given year.77 He finds that the
probability of a given industry being located in a county increases by
at least fourteen percent in four of the five industries considered after
a county switches from nonattainment to attainment.78
Becker and Henderson continue this line of inquiry, using plantlevel data over the period from 1963 to 1992 for the industrial organic
chemicals, miscellaneous plastic products, metal cans and barrels, and
the wood furniture sectors.79 The data used by Becker and Henderson
came from the Longitudinal Research Database, administered by the
Center for Economic Studies of the U.S. Census Bureau. The results
are in line with the prior studies; nonattainment status reduces the
expected number of new plant births by twenty-six to forty-five
percent.80 However, the authors find that new plants locating in
nonattainment counties are initially larger in size (relative to new
plants locating in attainment areas). This size discrepancy disappears
after roughly ten years.81
Greenstone builds on this research by examining approximately
.75 million plant-level observations over the period from 1967 to 1987,
obtained from the Census of Manufactures, to assess the separate
impacts of carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and total
suspended particulate nonattainment status across all counties in the
United States.82 With such rich data, the author is able to identify the
77.

See Vernon Henderson, The Impact of Air Quality Regulation on
Industrial Location, 45 Annals Econ. & Stat. 123, 128–29 (1997)
(addressing “the discrete choice problem of whether the county has the
industry or not”).

78.

See id. at 132 (“Specifically, for each industry for the base, I take a
county in non-attainment status and assign it a base probability of
having the industry in year t of 0.25. I then calculate the positive effect
of moving to attainment status. . . . The effects are very large.
Probabilities rise from 0.25 to anywhere from 0.39 to 0.71. This would
suggest that attainment status is a key variable in firm location
decisions.” (citation omitted)).

79.

Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations
on Polluting Industries, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 379, 386–88 (2000).

80.

Id. at 397 (“Nonattainment status in the regulatory era reduces the
expected number of births in a county by 26–45 percent, depending on
the industry, with the largest impact occurring for the industry with the
largest plant sizes, industrial organic chemicals.”).

81.

See id. at 411 (“New plants . . . are significantly larger in
nonattainment counties than in attainment counties, by 25–69 percent.
That effect then diminishes with age, so that plants 10+ years have a
similar size in nonattainment counties.”).

82.

See Greenstone, supra note 74, at 1183–84.
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effect of nonattainment status on plants in sectors deemed to be high
emitters of each of the four criteria pollutants using only the temporal
variation within plants, controlling for industry-level and county-level
unobserved attributes in an unrestricted way. The results indicate
that over the period from 1972 to 1987, nonattainment counties
(relative to in attainment counties) lost roughly 590,000 jobs, $37
billion in capital stock, and $75 billion in output.83
In a series of papers by Professor List and co-authors, the impacts
of ozone nonattainment status on county-level industrial activity in
New York State are examined over the period from 1980 to 1990.
Annual data on new plant births by domestic and foreign firms, as
well as plant relocations, are provided by the Industrial Migration
File maintained by the New York State Department of Economic
Development.84 List, McHone, and Millimet focus on plant relocations
and find that being in nonattainment costs a county roughly 0.50
fewer relocating plants in pollution-intensive sectors per year relative
to being in attainment.85 Given that the average county in the sample
only receives about 0.2 relocating plants per year, this represents a
sizeable decrease. List, Millimet, McHone, and Fredriksson analyze
new plant births using similar statistical techniques. Here, the authors
find even larger effects: nonattainment counties lose out on
approximately one new pollution-intensive plant per year relative to
counties in attainment.86 The average county in the sample obtains
0.4 new plant births per year. Finally, List, McHone, and Millimet
revisit the data on new plant births, distinguishing between new plant
births by foreign and domestic firms. The authors find that the prior
deterrent effects of nonattainment status on new plant births is driven
entirely by domestically owned plants; foreign-owned plants are
unresponsive to spatial variation in environmental regulatory costs
due to differences in ozone attainment status.87
83.

See id. at 1178.

84.

John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet, Per G. Fredriksson & W. Warren
McHone, Effects of Environmental Regulations on Manufacturing Plant
Births: Evidence from a Propensity Score Matching Estimator, 85 Rev.
Econ. & Stat. 944, 945 (2003).

85.

John A. List, W. Warren McHone & Daniel L. Millimet, Effects of Air
Quality Regulation on the Destination Choice of Relocating Plants, 55
Oxford Econ. Papers 657, 674 (2003) (“[E]stimates suggest that
approximately 0.50 fewer plants per year relocate in a county that is
[out of attainment].”).

86.

See List, Millimet, Fredriksson & McHone, supra note 84, at 948 (“[A]n
estimated ‘cost’ of being out of attainment . . . is between 0.7 and 1.3
new plants per year.”).

87.

John A. List, W. Warren McHone & Daniel L. Millimet, Effects of
Environmental Regulation on Foreign and Domestic Plant Births: Is
There a Home Field Advantage?, 56 J. Urb. Econ. 303, 324 (2004)
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The other branch of this second wave of the empirical literature
on the effects of environmental regulation on the location of industrial
activity analyzes patterns of international trade and FDI (the socalled pollution haven hypothesis). The criticisms of the early
literature are particularly worrisome when examining the effects of
cross-country differences in environmental regulation. First, one needs
a consistent measure of environmental regulation across multiple
countries. Second, one needs extensive data on country (or industry)
characteristics; otherwise any association between environmental
stringency and the patterns of global trade or investment may simply
reflect unobserved attributes of countries (or industries) correlated
with both regulation and the location of industrial activity. The
traditional econometric approach used to overcome measurement error
in the proxy for environmental regulation and unobserved, countrylevel heterogeneity is the method of instrumental variables. While not
all studies employing instrumental variables are necessarily sound
(due to the use of weak or potentially invalid instruments), this
Article focuses only on studies that employ this technique as the
alternative—such as cross-sectional or fixed-effects estimation—
because this approach is not likely to produce causal estimates of the
impacts of environmental regulation in this Article’s author’s view
(due to the requirement that all independent variables in such models
be strictly exogenous).
The first set of studies focus on patterns of FDI. Professors Xing
and Kolstad assess the pattern on U.S. outbound FDI in six
manufacturing sectors across twenty-two host countries using data
from 1985 and 1990.88 As a proxy for environmental regulation, the
authors utilize sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. The authors find more
lax regulation (as measured by higher SO2 emissions) leads to greater
investment in the United States within two pollution-intensive
industries: chemicals and primary metals.89 There is no meaningful
effect for the other, less pollution-intensive, sectors considered.
Professors Fredriksson, List, and Millimet examine the impact of
environmental stringency on U.S. inbound FDI across the forty-eight
contiguous states for the period from 1977 to 1986.90 To measure
(“[W]e find that domestic plants are responsive to environmental
standards whereas foreign plants are not.”).
88.

See Yuquing Xing & Charles D. Kolstad, Do Lax Environmental
Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?, 21 Envtl. & Resource
Econ. 1, 11–12 (2002).

89.

See id. at 15 (“In general, lax environmental policy tends to attract
more capital inflow from the US for pollution intensive industries.”).

90.

See Per G. Fredriksson, John A. List & Daniel L. Millimet,
Bureaucratic Corruption, Environmental Policy and Inbound US FDI:
Theory and Evidence, 87 J. Pub. Econ. 1407, 1413–19 (2003).
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environmental regulation, the authors utilize an index based on the
ratio of actual pollution abatement expenditures incurred by plants
located in the state to the predicted level of expenditures based on the
state’s industrial composition. The results indicate a meaningful
deleterious effect of stringency on inbound FDI. For example, the
effect of one standard deviation in stringency in California in 1984 is
predicted to lower employment in the foreign-owned chemical plants
by six percent—or 2500 jobs.91
Professors Cole and Elliott analyze the patterns of U.S. outbound
FDI in Brazil and Mexico across thirty-one and thirty-six industries
respectively from 1989–1994.92 The authors’ goal is to disentangle the
effects of environmental regulatory costs—measured by industry-level
pollution abatement costs per unit of value added—on firm behavior
from the effects of endowments of physical capital. Specifically, the
authors contend that since many pollution-intensive sectors are also
capital-intensive, the benefit to firms from more lax environmental
standards in less developed countries may be offset by lower levels of
physical capital in these same countries.93 Brazil and Mexico, the
authors argue, are relatively well endowed with physical capital but
have lax environmental standards, thus making it more likely that
investment in these countries will be more sensitive to environmental
costs.94 Indeed, the authors find evidence supporting the claim that
sectors experiencing relatively high environmental regulatory costs in
the United States do invest more in each country.
Cole and Fredriksson utilize data on inbound FDI to thirteen
countries that are members of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) and twenty less developed
countries over the period from 1982 to 1992.95 The proxy variable for
environmental regulation is the allowable lead content in gasoline.
The results point to a sizeable, deleterious effect of environmental
regulation on the amount of inbound FDI enjoyed by a country. For
example, roughly one standard deviation increase in the authors’
measure of regulation leads to approximately a 0.6 standard deviation
reduction in a country’s stock of FDI.96
91.

See id. at 1424.

92.

See Matthew A. Cole & Robert J.R. Elliott, FDI and the Capital
Intensity of “Dirty” Sectors: A Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven
Puzzle, 9 Rev. Dev. Econ. 530, 533–36 (2005).

93.

See id. at 535.

94.

See id. (“Brazil and Mexico are two developing countries with
reasonably high capital-labor ratios, yet with reasonably low levels of
environmental regulations.”).

95.

See Matthew A. Cole & Per G. Fredriksson, Institutionalized Pollution
Havens, 68 Ecological Econ. 1239, 1245–46 (2009).

96.

Id. at 1251.
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Professor Kellenberg focuses on effects of country-level
environmental stringency on the value added of majority-owned U.S.
affiliates in fifty countries across nine industries over the period from
1999 to 2003.97 To measure environmental policy, Kellenberg uses
data from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) on the
stringency and enforcement of environmental regulations. The GCR
creates separate indices related to stringency and enforcement based
on survey responses elicited from executives.98 The results point to a
meaningful effect of environmental regulation on the location of
production abroad by majority-owned U.S. affiliates. Specifically, for
the top quintile of countries in terms of the increase in economic
activity by majority-owned U.S. affiliates over the sample period,
8.6% of this increase is attributable to more lax environmental
policies in these countries.99
Finally, Professors Millimet and Roy analyze the pattern of
inbound FDI across the forty-eight contiguous U.S. states from 1977
to 1986 and 1988 to 1994 using recently developed econometric
techniques designed for situations where valid instrumental variables
are difficult to envision.100 The measure of state-level environmental
regulation is identical to that used by Fredriksson, List, and
Millimet.101 The authors find an adverse impact of environmental
regulation on the amount of FDI locating in a state for the pollutionintensive chemical sector, but no effect on the level of FDI for
manufacturing as a whole.102
The second set of studies focus on patterns of international trade.
Cole and Elliot examine the impact of environmental regulation on
the net exports of sixty countries in four pollution-intensive sectors in
1995.103 The sectors studied include iron and steel, chemicals, pulp
97.

See Derek K. Kellenberg, An Empirical Investigation of the Pollution
Haven Effect with Strategic Environment and Trade Policy, 78 J. of
Int’l Econ. 242, 244–46 (2009).

98.

Id.

99.

See id. at 250 (“Put differently, approximately 8.6% of U.S. affiliate
value added growth by the top 20th percentile countries can be
attributed to falling environmental policy.”).

100. See Daniel L. Millimet & Jayjit Roy, Three New Empirical Tests of the
Pollution Haven Hypothesis When Environmental Regulation Is
Endogenous 7–9 (Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA), Discussion
Paper Series No. 5911, 2011).
101. See Fredriksson, List & Millimet, supra note 90, at 1414.
102. See Millimet & Roy, supra note 100, at 22 (“[W]e consistently
find . . . a negative and economically significant impact of own
environmental stringency on inbound FDI in the chemical sector.”).
103. Matthew A. Cole & Robert J.R. Elliott, Do Environmental Regulations
Influence Trade Patterns? Testing Old and New Trade Theories, 26
World Econ. 1163, 1166–67 (2003).
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and paper, and non-ferrous metals. Two measures of environmental
stringency are employed. The first is an index based on country
reports concerning environmental policies and enforcement compiled
under United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
guidelines. The second is a proxy variable computed using information
on the energy intensity of production. The authors find no effects of
environmental stringency on net exports, but they do find effects on
the composition of trade: stricter regulation leads to a greater fraction
of trade that is inter-industry.104
Several studies utilize U.S. industry-level measures of
environmental costs based on pollution abatement expenditures to
assess the impact of regulation on industry-level measures of U.S.
imports or exports. Professors Ederington and Minier analyze data on
the net imports of 374 U.S. industries over the period of 1978, 1980 to
1986, and 1988 to 1992.105 The authors find extremely large effects of
environmental costs on net imports. Specifically, they find that a one
percent increase in pollution abatement costs results in a thirty
percent increase in net imports scaled by the total value of U.S.
shipments in the industry.106 Similarly, Cole, Elliott, and Shimamoto
analyze the effect of environmental costs on U.S. net exports across
ninety-six industries over the same time period.107 The authors also
control for the human and physical capital intensity of sectors, finding
a detrimental effect of environmental costs on net exports. However,
the magnitude of the effect is much smaller than that attributable to
human or physical capital considerations.108
104. See id. at 1179 (“[W]e found no evidence to suggest that either of our
two measures of environmental regulations were statistically significant
determinants of ‘dirty’ net exports. . . . Our results suggest that the
shares of trade that are intra- and inter-industry are indeed influenced
by environmental regulation differentials between two countries.”).
105. Josh Ederington & Jenny Minier, Is Environmental Policy a Secondary
Trade Barrier? An Empirical Analysis, 36 Can. J. Econ. 137, 142–43,
150 app.A (2003).
106. See id. at 146 (“[W]e estimate that an industry with pollution
abatement costs 1 percentage point higher than otherwise identical
industries will have a net import ratio over 30 percentage points
higher . . . .”).
107. Matthew A. Cole, Robert J.R. Elliott & Kenichi Shimamoto, Why the
Grass Is Not Always Greener: The Competing Effects of Environmental
Regulations and Factor Intensities on US Specialization, 54
Ecological Econ. 95 (2005).
108. See id. at 107 (“We illustrate in a variety of ways that pollution
intensive industries are typically more intensive in the use of physical
and human capital than cleaner industries. These factor intensities
appear to be important determinants of US specialization patterns,
suggesting that factor intensities and environmental regulations have a
competing influence on revealed comparative advantage.”).
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Finally, Professors Levinson and Taylor examine U.S. net imports
from Mexico and Canada across 132 industries over the period from
1977 to 1986.109 The authors also find a large, adverse effect of
environmental costs on domestic production. For example, net
imports from Canada increased by $601 million for the average
industry in the sample over this period; $79 million of this increase is
attributable to the rise in pollution abatement costs.110 Among the
twenty industries in the U.S. that experienced the largest rise in
pollution abatement costs, the numbers are $595 million and $453
million, respectively.111
The final two studies utilize data across several countries.
Professors Jug and Mirza analyze the import patterns of twelve
countries in the EU15 and export patterns of nineteen countries from
the EU15, central Europe, and eastern Europe across nine industries
over the period from 1996 to 1999.112 Environmental regulation is
measured using data from the Eurostat Environmental Expenditures
and Environmental Taxes database on total current expenditures
related to environmental protection activities for all manufacturing.
The results indicate a meaningful, negative effect of environmental
stringency on domestic production, with results of greater magnitude
for eastern Europe.113
Professors Mulatu, Gerlagh, Rigby, and Wossink utilize data on
sixteen industries across thirteen countries to assess the role of
environmental regulation on the share of production in each industry
that occurs in each country. The objective is to determine whether
countries with relatively less stringent regulation are responsible for a
greater share of production in pollution-intensive sectors over the
period from 1990 to 1994. The country-level measure of regulation is
given by the Environmental Sustainability Index (collected in 2001)
developed by the World Economic forum, Yale Center for
Environmental Law, and Center for International Earth Science
Information Network at Columbia University. As with the prior

109. Arik Levinson & M. Scott Taylor, Unmasking the Pollution Haven
Effect, 49 Int’l Econ. Rev. 223, 237–40 (2008).
110. See id. at 246, 252 (calculating the net import increase from the average
increase in trade volume as compared to the abatement costs).
111. See id. at 252.
112. Jerneja Jug & Daniel Mirza, Environmental Regulations in Gravity
Equations: Evidence from Europe, 28 World Econ. 1591, 1600–03
(2005).
113. See id. at 1612 (“[E]nvironmental stringency matters more for Eastern
European exporters, since EU importers might be more sensitive to
developing countries’ average lower product quality and lack of varieties
provided.”).
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studies, the findings point to significantly greater domestic production
in pollution-intensive industries in countries with lax regulation.114
In sum, second generation studies—utilizing better data to
identify the causal effect of environmental policy—have consistently
documented a meaningful effect of environmental stringency on the
location of economic activity. That said, these findings must be
interpreted carefully. First, environmental costs are a small fraction of
the total production costs for most industrial sectors.115 Thus, the
effects documented in the literature typically apply to only the most
pollution-intensive industries. For the vast majority of industries,
environmental costs are a small fraction of overall costs and location
decisions are dominated by other factors. For example, Henderson and
Millimet allow for heterogeneous effects of more stringent
environmental policy on the amount of foreign investment and find
the effects to be negative for some locations and positive for others.116
Consistent with this finding, Henderson and Millimet had previously
found no overall effect of environmental stringency on the Gross State
Product of U.S. states.117
Second, the effects estimated by econometric models are ceteris
paribus effects. In other words, they indicate the impact of more
stringent environment regulation with “other things being equal” or
with the assumption that all other variables are being held
constant.118 In practice, other important determinants of the location
of economic activity are not held fixed such as a location’s endowment
of physical and human capital. This fact is highlighted in several
analyses. Studies by Ederington, Levinson, and Minier and Levinson
show that the rate of increase in total U.S. imports has risen faster
over the past few decades than the rate of imports of pollution114. See id. at 475 (“[I]ncreased environmental regulatory laxity does not
result in an increased share of the ‘average’ industry. However, when the
most polluting, rather than the average, industry is considered,
increased environmental regulatory laxity does result in a higher
proportion of this dirty industry locating there.”).
115. See Jaffee, Peterson, Portney & Stavins, supra note 63, at 158 (“[F]or
all but the most heavily regulated industries, the cost of complying with
federal environmental regulation is a relatively small fraction of total
cost of production.”).
116. Daniel J. Henderson & Daniel L. Millimet, Pollution Abatement Costs
and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to U.S. States: A Nonparametric
Reassessment, 89 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 178, 179 (2007).
117. Daniel J. Henderson & Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Regulation
and US State-Level Production, 87 Econ. Letters 47, 52 (2005)
(“[T]he lack of an observed association between the stringency of
environmental regulation and state-level output is robust.”).
118. Black’s Law Dictionary 260 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “ceteris
paribus”).
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intensive goods.119 As such, the pollution content of U.S. imports has
fallen over a period where U.S. regulatory stringency has increased
markedly.120 Professors Grether, Mathys, and de Melo analyze the
pollution content of imports across forty-eight countries and find that
environmental standards play a small role in the overall pattern of
trade.121 In this vein, Cole and Elliott conclude: “We do not suggest
that pollution havens are widespread.”122
Finally, while the studies reviewed in this Part make use of
instrumental-variables or fixed-effects strategies in an attempt to
isolate the causal effect of environmental regulation, not all
identification strategies are convincing.123 Accordingly, readers should
be cognizant that simply because researchers employ panel-data-fixedeffects or instrumental-variables methods does not mean that such
strategies produce credible inferences.
B.

Preference Heterogeneity

The Tiebout framework relies on heterogeneous individuals
sorting themselves across communities offering different combinations
of taxes and public goods. In equilibrium, the policies of each
community will reflect the preferences of its homogeneous residents.
The literature on environmental federalism, and fiscal federalism more
generally, has long touted the ability of communities to synchronize
policy choices with individual preferences as the primary advantage of
decentralized policy making. Gordon states: “One of the key
advantages of decentralization is the resulting diversity of policies.”124
119. See, e.g., Josh Ederington, Arik Levinson & Jenny Minier, Trade
Liberalization and Pollution Havens, 4 Advances Econ. Analysis &
Pol’y 1, 6 fig.1B (2004) (demonstrating an increase in U.S. imports
overall as compared to the import of pollution-intensive products).
120. Arik Levinson, Offshoring Pollution: Is the United States Increasingly
Importing Polluting Goods?, 4 Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 63, 79
(2010) (“Today the United States imports proportionally more clean
goods and proportionally fewer polluting goods than was the case 30
years ago. Perhaps even more surprisingly, the green shift in imports is
even larger than the green shift in domestic production. In other words,
the analysis here finds that the United States has not been offshoring
pollution.”).
121. Jean-Marie Grether, Nicole Andréa Mathys & Jaime de Melo,
Unravelling the Worldwide Pollution Haven Effect, 21 J. Int’l Trade
& Econ. Dev. 131, 131 (2012) (“[E]conometric estimates suggest a
significant pollution haven effect . . . . On a global scale, because the
bulk of trade is intra-regional with a high North-North share, these
effects are small relative to the ‘deep’ determinants of worldwide PCI
[pollution content of imports].”).
122. Cole & Elliott, supra note 92, at 541.
123. E.g., Millimet & Roy, supra note 100, at 4–6.
124. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 582.
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Oates writes: “The hope is that state and local governments, being
closer to the people, will be more responsive to the particular
preferences of their constituencies . . . .”125 Adler asserts that
“localized control of environmental policy will produce environmental
measures that are more likely to reflect the preferences and needs of
those who will be most affected by them.”126
In practice, the advantages to decentralized policy making depend
on three factors: (1) the extent of preference heterogeneity in the
population; (2) the degree to which individuals act on such
preferences to sort themselves into homogeneous communities; and (3)
the ability of local governments to better respond to community
preferences than the central government. I discuss the empirical
evidence on each in turn.
For the purposes of evaluating the benefits of decentralization,
empirical evidence on the extent of heterogeneous preferences over
environmental issues is scant. Several papers utilize survey or voting
data to examine associations between socioeconomic characteristics
and preferences. Elliott, Seldon, and Regens use data from the
General Social Survey, which is administered by the U.S. National
Opinion Research Center, to analyze public attitudes toward
environmental spending over the periods from 1974 to 1978, 1980, and
1982 to 1991.127 The authors find that liberalism, lower age, being
female, being nonwhite, urban status, education, and income are
positively associated with preferences for environmental spending.128
However, one is not able to discern how much overall variation in
preferences exists, nor how much of this variation is explained by
these attributes.
Additional analyses have been undertaken using individual-level,
cross-country data. Professors Israel and Levinson utilize data
spanning thirty-three countries from the World Values Survey during
the mid-1990s.129 Consistent with the prior study, the authors find
that lower age, being female, education, and income are positively
associated with willingness to pay for environmental improvements.130
However, the vast majority of the variation in willingness to pay
125. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1120.
126. See Adler, supra note 9, at 138.
127. Euel Elliott, Barry J. Seldon & James L. Regens, Political and
Economic Determinants of Individuals’ Support for Environmental
Spending, 51 J. Envtl. Mgmt. 15, 17–19 (1997).
128. See id. at 20–25.
129. Debra Israel & Arik Levinson, Willingness to Pay for Environmental
Quality: Testable Empirical Implications of the Growth and
Environment Literature, 3 Contributions to Econ. Analysis &
Pol’y no. 1, 2004, at 1, 9–15.
130. See id. at 12.
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(seventy-two percent) is explained by the country one resides in, not
by the socioeconomic attributes included in the analysis.131 As such,
over two-thirds of the international variation in willingness to pay
occurs across countries, with the rest representing within-country
variation.132
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon discuss data collected by the European
Opinion Research Group in 2002 across EU15 member states on
individual concerns regarding climate change.133 The authors report
the percentage of survey respondents in each country reporting that
they are “very worried” about climate change. The percentages varied
from about twenty-one percent in The Netherlands to about sixtythree percent in Greece.134 When asked about concern over future
trends in climate change, the percentage responding “very much” or
“quite a lot” varied from roughly forty-nine percent in the
Netherlands to roughly eighty-five percent in Greece and Italy.135
Thus, there is variation in concern over climate change both within
and across countries.
Professors Kahn and Matsusaka examine county-level voting on
sixteen environmental ballot initiatives in California spanning 1970 to
1994.136 The authors report the county with the lowest and highest
fraction of votes in favor of each ballot initiative.137 For example,
Proposition 1986-65 that sought to restrict the release of chemicals
into drinking water sources received 32.7% votes in favor in the least
favorable county and 78.3% votes in favor in the most favorable
county.138 Other ballot measures yielded greater variation. Votes in
favor of Proposition 1990-130 that sought to ban clear-cutting of
forests and authorize a $742 million bond issue to buy forest land
ranged from 15.3% in the least favorable county to 70.7% in the most

131. See id. at 12, 21.
132. See id. at 15 (“[E]ven though we have included ample demographic
characteristics of respondents, the country fixed effects explain a large
fraction of the variation in the responses.”).
133. Irene Lorenzoni & Nick F. Pidgeon, Public Views on Climate Change:
European and USA Perspectives, 77 Climatic Change 73, 76 (2006).
134. See id. at 76 (“Some of the most worried were southern European states
such as Greece (63%) and Italy (49%), whilst among the least worried
were northern European nations such as The Netherlands (21% of very
worried respondents), Ireland (25%) and the UK (26%) . . . .”).
135. Id. at 77.
136. Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental
Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L.
& Econ. 137, 142–45, 149–51 (1997).
137. See id. at 144–45.
138. Id. at 144.
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favorable county.139 This is indicative of significant variation in
preferences across counties. Kahn and Matsusaka further find that
much of this cross-county variation is explained by differences in per
capita income, urban status, education, and per capita income derived
from specific industries (construction, farming, forestry, and
manufacturing).140
Rather than relying on survey response data, several studies
utilize information on home values and environmental amenities (or
disamenities) to assess the demand for environmental quality.
Professors Zabel and Kiel combine data from the American Housing
Survey, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the EPA across four cities
(Chicago, Denver, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.) from 1974 to
1991 to estimate household-level marginal willingness to pay for air
quality by relating local air quality to home values.141 The authors
then examine the association between household characteristics and
this value. In contrast to the results above, Zabel and Kiel find lower
marginal willingness to pay for nonwhites and no meaningful
association with gender.142
Professors Brasington and Hite utilize data on home sales across
six metropolitan areas in Ohio (Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo) in 1991 to first estimate the implicit
price of distance from the nearest environmental hazard and then
examine the effect of price, income, and other attributes on the
demand.143 The authors find a small, negative price elasticity of
demand for distance from the nearest environmental hazard and a
positive income elasticity of demand for distance from the nearest
environmental hazard.144 Carruthers and Clark follow the strategy
139. Id. at 145.
140. See id. at 167 (“[A] small set of standard economic variables can
account for the majority of the variance in county voting patterns.”).
141. Jeffrey E. Zabel & Katherine A. Kiel, Estimating the Demand for Air
Quality in Four U.S. Cities, 76 Land Econ. 174, 180–82 (2000).
142. See id. at 189 (“The MWTP [marginal willingness to pay] for all four air
quality measures is significantly lower for black and Hispanic
households. Whether the household head is married or male does not
appear to have a consistently significant effect on MTWP [sic] for the
four air quality measures.”).
143. David M. Brasington & Diane Hite, Demand for Environmental Quality:
A Spatial Hedonic Analysis, 35 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 57, 59–
72 (2005).
144. Id. at 77 (“Among the demand shift variables, higher income is
statistically significantly related to higher demand for environmental
quality. The non-spatial models achieved the same result, but suggested
a stronger effect than the spatial model. The estimated income elasticity
of demand for the spatial model is 0.044. The result suggests that people
do not purchase much more environmental quality when their incomes
rise.”); see also id. at 78 (“The implicit price of environmental quality is
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utilized by Brasington and Hite and examine data on home sales in
King County, Washington in 2004.145 The authors obtain similar
results in terms of the price and income elasticity of demand for
distance from the nearest environmental hazard.146
The second factor affecting the advantages to decentralization
relates to the degree to which individuals act on variation in
environmental preferences to sort themselves into homogeneous
communities. The preceding studies on preferences over
environmental quality provide little evidence in this regard. With the
exception of Kahn and Matsusaka, the studies discussed using survey
responses or voting behavior are geographically aggregated. Thus,
while preferences vary across individuals, there is no information
concerning the level of variation in the total population versus the
level of variation in a single community. Kahn and Matsusaka,
however, do provide evidence of significant variation in voting
behaviors across California counties driven by differences in income
and industrial composition.
Studies utilizing housing prices to infer something about the
willingness to pay for environmental amenities or how the prices of
environmental amenities affect its demand also fail to provide insights
into the amount of overall variation in preferences or whether
preferences are more homogeneous at the city level than at the state
or country level. Lastly, the empirical evidence on population mobility
discussed in Part II.A.1 indicates that residential location choices, at
least in the United States, are driven primarily by employment
prospects.
The final factor impacting the advantages to decentralized policy
making pertains to the ability of local governments to better respond
to community preferences than the central government. If preferences
concerning the environment do vary across individuals and individuals
do sort into homogeneous communities, both of which are far from
certain, are local policy makers better able to align environmental
policies with these preferences? While this is typically asserted, as
evidenced by some of the quotes above, there is no evidence to
support this contention. Wilson states:

negatively related to quantity demanded; the price elasticity of demand
of -0.12 suggests a relatively inelastic demand curve.”).
145. John I. Carruthers & David E. Clark, Valuing Environmental Quality: A
Space-Based Strategy, 50 J. Regional Sci. 801, 807–12 (2010).
146. Id. at 828 (“These results are remarkably consistent with work done by
Brasington and Hite (2005), who also found an inelastic price elasticity
of demand . . . .”); see also id. at 829 (“That said, as expected, all of the
elasticities that come out of this calculation are positive, meaning that
distance from environmental hazards is a normal good so, other things
being equal, households spend more on it as their incomes rise.”).
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[W]e do not have a good understanding of how information
asymmetries occur between different levels of government, and
what exact form these asymmetries take. Rather, we have vague
ideas, such as the understanding that local officials know more
because they are “closer to the people.” . . . [I]t seems difficult
to justify why the central authority cannot easily obtain the
information that is assumed absent.147

In sum, the empirical evidence regarding preference heterogeneity
and its implications on environmental federalism is limited and
incomplete. While it seems likely that preferences do vary, perhaps
much of this variation is across countries. The main drivers of withincountry variation are income, education, and industry. Because these
attributes are easily observed, Wilson’s point about central
governments being as capable as localities of understanding local
preferences appears valid. That said, it is not clear that communities
are particularly homogeneous with respect to these attributes. For
example, in terms of income, the level of income inequality in 1999
across all households in the United States was 0.463 as measured by
the Gini coefficient, a common measure of inequality.148 The Gini
coefficient ranges from zero to one, where zero indicates perfect
equality (all households have identical incomes) and one indicates
perfect inequality (one household possesses all income). The
corresponding state-level Gini coefficients ranged from 0.402 (Alaska)
to 0.499 (New York).149 County-level Gini coefficients are available
pooling data from 2006 to 2010. Between counties, the Gini
coefficients vary from 0.207 (Loving, TX) to 0.645 (East Carroll
Parish, Louisiana), while the Gini coefficient for the United States as
a whole was 0.467 over this time period.150 Among the twenty-five
most populous counties in the United States, the Gini coefficients
range from 0.417 (Suffolk County, New York) to 0.601 (New York
County, New York).151
This suggests that there is not much sorting at the state or
county level according to income, which is a strong predictor of
environmental preferences. In any event, much more research is
needed on the extent of preference heterogeneity and, more
147. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 277.
148. U.S. Census Bureau, Income: Table S4. Gini Ratios by State
(2010), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/his
torical/state/state4.html.
149. Id.
150. U.S. Census Bureau, Household Income Inequality Within U.S.
Counties: 2006–2010, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2012pubs/acsbr10-18.pdf.
151. Id. at 4.

1699

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·201
Environmental Federalism

importantly, whether individuals sort themselves such that localities
within a country are less heterogeneous than the country as a whole.
C.

Interjursidictional Externalities

Efficiency of decentralized policy making in both the Tiebout and
interjurisdictional competition frameworks requires local governments
to internalize all externalities.152 A lengthy empirical literature has
emerged assessing the practical relevance of spillovers across
jurisdictions. This is crucial because the failure of local governments
to internalize all externalities is often cited as the main argument
against decentralized policy making. For example, Engel writes:
The interstate spillover rationale is the classic economic
efficiency argument that federal intervention is necessary to
prevent the environmental, social, and economic losses that
accrue when air and water pollution originating in one state are
carried by natural forces into other states. States from which
the pollution originates have little incentive to curb interstate
pollution because they benefit from having the harmful effects of
pollution externalized while they enjoy the economic benefits of
the polluting activity.153

Professor Sigman notes that the size of “spillovers across
jurisdictions . . . is a central question in the literature on the problem
of assigning functions to different levels of government.”154 Adler
states: “The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the
context of interstate spillovers.”155 Hall writes: “One of the
foundational justifications for the federalization of environmental law
is the problem of interstate environmental harms.”156 Dijkstra and
Fredriksson state: “Transboundary pollution is a standard and wellknown reason for preferring centralized environmental policy

152. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 93 (“Without these simplifying and
externality internalizing assumptions, the efficiency result evaporates.”);
see also Revesz, supra note 17, at 1212 (“Most importantly, the other
prominent market-failure argument for federal environmental regulation
is that, in the absence of such regulation, interstate externalities will
lead states to underregulate because some of the benefits will accrue to
other states.”).
153. See Engel, supra note 64, at 285.
154. Hilary Sigman, Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 107, 117
(2003).
155. Adler, supra note 9, at 140.
156. Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an
Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 49, 50 (2008).
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making . . . .”157 Professor Esty notes: “While a few environmental
harms (some waste problems, for example) are geographically
localized, many forms of pollution (surface water contamination and
most air pollutants, for example) spread across the land. Because
state boundaries often do not fully encompass airsheds and
watersheds, interjurisdictional externalities arise.”158
The empirical literature can be categorized by the type of
externality considered. This Article will refer to the first category as
resource externalities. This is the case where the actions of one
jurisdiction affect the resource quantity or quality available to other
jurisdictions.159 These situations are discussed in Part II.C.1. The
second category is referred to as “pecuniary externalit[ies]” by
Wilson.160 This refers to situations where the actions of one
jurisdiction affect prices in other jurisdictions. These situations are
discussed in Part II.C.2. A final category of externalities is denoted by
Wilson as “fiscal externalit[ies].”161 This is the case where the policy
choices of one jurisdiction have effects on the policy choices of other
jurisdictions through strategic policy making.162 This will be discussed
in Part II.C.3.
1.

Resource Externalities

The empirical literature on resource externalities focuses on
whether jurisdictions fail to consider the effects of their actions on the
quality or quantity of a resource available in other jurisdictions.
Transboundary pollution is the canonical example. With
transboundary pollution, one jurisdiction fails to consider the full
environmental consequences of its actions as some of the costs—
typically in terms of greater air or water pollution—fall outside one’s
jurisdiction. Another type of spillover may occur when resources are
shared across multiple jurisdictions. Common examples of such shared
157. See Dijkstra & Fredriksson, supra note 22, at 320.
158. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L.
Rev. 570, 625 (1996).
159. Often resource externalities are referred to simply as spillovers. See, e.g.,
Jan K. Brueckner, Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An
Overview of Empirical Studies, 26 Int’l Regional Sci. Rev. 175, 176
(2003).
160. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 272.
161. Id.
162. The policy choices in one location may impact prices in neighboring
locations as well. Thus, pecuniary and fiscal externalities do overlap.
However, the Author invokes the distinction that pecuniary externalities
occur even absent a behavioral response from neighboring governments,
whereas fiscal externalities explicitly require a policy response by
neighboring jurisdictions.
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resources are watersheds, fisheries in the ocean, and endangered
species that are present in multiple jurisdictions.
Professors Murdoch, Sandler, and Sargent examined emissions of
sulphur and nitrogen oxides in twenty-five European countries during
the 1980s and early 1990s.163 The authors explore the reductions in
these types of emissions achieved after the formulation of the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP).
In particular, the authors are motivated by the fact that mandated
reductions for sulfur were more likely to be met than for nitrogen
oxides (NOx). In an attempt to understand this, the authors
investigate the importance of transboundary spillovers in explaining
cross-country variation in emissions reductions achieved under
LRTAP. Specifically, the authors estimate separate econometric
models for the two types of emissions and incorporate two measures of
spillovers as independent variables in the model. The first measure
captures the fraction of a country’s emissions that stay within its own
borders. The second measure captures the amount of emissions
originating outside of one’s own jurisdiction that ends up in one’s
jurisdiction.164
Since sulfur emissions are less likely to spill across jurisdictional
boundaries, if these variables are meaningful (in a statistical and
economic sense) determinants of emissions, then externalities not only
play an important role in determining emissions, but also help explain
the disparate trends in sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions in Europe
over this time period. The results point to a very meaningful effect of
the second measure of spillovers: as the amount of emissions entering
one’s jurisdiction from other countries declines, a country’s own
emissions rise. The authors interpret this finding as indicative of free
riding behavior by countries.165 However, the first measure is found to
have at best a weak statistical relationship with emissions.166
Kahn examines the importance of transboundary pollution using
data at the county-level from the United States.167 Specifically, he
assesses the impact of manufacturing activity in one’s own county, as
163. James C. Murdoch, Todd Sandler & Keith Sargent, A Tale of Two
Collectives: Sulphur Versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in
Europe, 64 Economica 281, 287–92 (1997).
164. Id. at 290–91 (describing the first measure as “OWNSUL” and the
second measure as “SPILL”).
165. Id. at 294 (“The negative and significant estimate on the SPILL term is
entirely consistent with strategic (within-region) free-riding associated
with the Nash assumption . . . .”).
166. See id. at 295 (finding the OWNSUL parameter estimates significant
only in one specific model).
167. Matthew E. Kahn, The Silver Lining of Rust Belt Manufacturing
Decline, 46 J. Urb. Econ. 360, 363–65 (1999).
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well as adjacent counties, on ambient concentrations of total
suspended particulates (TSP). The data are from 1977, 1982, and
1987, thus spanning a period during which manufacturing activity
experienced large declines. However, the spatial and temporal
variation in this decline allows Kahn to assess its impact on own and
neighboring county air quality.
Kahn’s results suggest that manufacturing activity in adjacent
counties has meaningful effects on a county’s own ambient
concentrations.168 For example, a full standard deviation increase in a
county’s own activity in the primary metal industry raises ambient
concentrations of TSP by 3.5%. A standard deviation increase in
activity in the primary metals industry in a county’s adjacent
neighbors raises a county’s own ambient concentrations of TSP by
1.1%. A standard deviation increase in activity in the stone, clay, and
glass industry in a county’s adjacent neighbors raises a county’s own
ambient concentrations of TSP by 4.1%.169 For the other industries
Kahn considers, the discrepancy between the effects of a county’s own
activity and that of its neighbors is smaller.
A series of studies by Sigman investigates pollution in rivers in
order to assess the empirical relevance of transboundary spillovers. In
the first study, Sigman uses international data on water quality
obtained from monitoring stations on rivers administered by the
United Nations’ Global Environmental Monitoring System Water
Quality Monitoring Project (GEMS/Water).170 The data span 291
river monitoring stations across forty-nine countries over the period
from 1979 to 1996. Sigman measures water quality using biochemical
oxygen demand (BOD). The results are consistent with free riding
behavior by countries.171 Pollution is meaningfully higher at upstream
locations (locations before a river flows into another country), as well
as in rivers that form the political border between two countries.
Interestingly, these effects apply predominantly to non-European
Union (EU) countries.172 Thus, institutional arrangements within the
EU are hypothesized to limit the extent of free riding in terms of river
pollution.
168. See id. at 369.
169. Id.
170. Hilary Sigman, International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do
Countries Free Ride?, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 1152, 1152–56 (2002).
171. Id. at 1158 (“My empirical analysis provides evidence that international
spillovers significantly impair water quality in rivers. . . . This evidence
of free-riding suggests that cooperation has not evolved between
countries sharing rivers.”).
172. See id. (“The EU appears to have successfully ameliorated free-riding:
one cannot reject that stations upstream of internal EU borders have
typical pollution levels.”).
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In her next study, Sigman undertakes a similar analysis with U.S.
data obtained from the National Stream Quality Accounting Network,
administered by the U.S. Geologic Survey.173 The data come from 501
monitoring stations and span the period from 1973 to 1995. Sigman
uses changes in the “authorization” or “primacy” status of
neighboring states under the Clean Water Act174 to assess the extent
of upstream states to free ride on their downstream neighbors.175 Since
the statistical procedure only utilizes temporal variation within states
arising from changes in authorization status, the results are more
likely to capture the causal effect of decentralized control.176
Measuring water pollution using the EPA’s water quality index based
on five major pollutants (dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform, total
suspended solids, phosphorous, and nitrogen), the results indicate a
four percent reduction in water quality at sites downstream from an
authorized state.177 In addition, rivers forming the border between
states suffer a six percent reduction in water quality if at least one
state is authorized.178
In a more recent study, Sigman continues to examine pollution
levels in rivers at the international level using data from
GEMS/Water spanning forty-seven countries over the period from
1979 to 1999.179 Two measures of pollution are examined: BOD and
fecal coliform. Compared to BOD, fecal coliform is considered to be
more of a local pollutant.180 In contrast to his earlier studies, here
Sigman assesses the impact of decentralization, defined at the
country-level,
on
subnational
variation
in
pollution.181
Decentralization is either measured using a binary indicator for a
federalist system, or as a continuous measure of the ratio of
173. Hilary Sigman, Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of
Environmental Policies, 50 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 82, 85–91
(2005).
174. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
175. Id. at 89–90.
176. See id. at 96 (“By focusing on changes in policy regimes in upstream
states, the estimated equations address unobserved geographic
heterogeneity that might otherwise make it difficult to isolate such
effects.”).
177. Id. at 92 (“The coefficient on being downstream from an authorized
state is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with
free riding.”).
178. Id. at 92–93.
179. Hilary Sigman, Decentralization and Environmental Quality: An
International Analysis of Water Pollution Levels and Variation, 90
Land Econ. 114, 115–16 (2014).
180. Id. at 116.
181. Id. at 114–15.
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subnational government expenditures to total government
expenditures (net of any intergovernmental transfers).182 The most
convincing results that utilize only temporal variation in the
continuous measure of decentralization suggest a harmful effect of
decentralization on BOD but not fecal coliform.183 Moreover,
decentralization is also found to increase the subnational variation in
both BOD and fecal coliform, consistent with a tailoring of
decentralized policies to local preferences.184
Other papers pursue a similar strategy to Sigman and assess the
impact of proximity to political boundaries on pollution. Professors
Helland and Whitford use reported emissions by U.S. establishments
from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) spanning between 1987 and
1996 to determine if emissions are higher from establishments located
in counties that border neighboring states (either any border or only
along the eastern edge).185 The results point to significantly higher air
and water emissions in establishments located on any border, and
effects even larger among establishments located on eastern borders.186
Interestingly, the results point to greater spillovers when the authors
allow for the possibility that establishments located in border counties
may systematically differ in unobserved dimensions from other
establishments.187
Professors Gray and Shadbegian utilize data on 409 U.S. pulp and
paper mills, from thirty-eight states, over the period from 1985 to
1997.188 The authors examine plant-level air emissions of particulates
(PM10) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) and water emissions of BOD and
total suspended solids. The importance of spillovers is measured by
182. Id. at 118.
183. See id. at 123–24 (“For BOD, the coefficient is statistically significant
and positive, with an elasticity of BOD levels to expenditure
decentralization of 0.188. A somewhat higher point estimate emerges
when the decentralization measure excludes national defense
spending . . . . In the fecal coliform equations, the coefficients are not
statistically significant for either measure of decentralization.”).
184. Id. at 126 (“A positive effect of federalism on interjurisdictional
variation is consistent with the traditional view of decentralization:
when localities have more power, they choose environmental quality
levels to correspond to local tastes and costs, resulting in greater
heterogeneity than under central authority.”).
185. Eric Helland & Andrew B. Whitford, Pollution Incidence and Political
Jurisdiction: Evidence from the TRI, 46 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt.
403, 407–11 (2003).
186. See id. at 413–22.
187. Id. at 411–22.
188. Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, “Optimal” Pollution
Abatement—Whose Benefits Matter, and How Much?, 47 J. Envtl.
Econ. & Mgmt. 510, 516–21 (2004).
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assessing the sensitivity of a plant’s emissions to the distance to the
nearest state or Canadian border, as well as by the marginal benefits
to reductions in air and water emissions enjoyed by neighboring
jurisdictions.189 For plants located within fifty miles of the Canadian
border, only BOD emissions are higher than other plants further from
the Canadian border; SO2 emissions are lower (attributable to the
focus on acid rain near the U.S.–Canadian border).190 The results also
suggest that plants reduce their emissions by less when the marginal
benefits from such reductions are enjoyed by neighboring jurisdictions.
For example, the authors find that out-of-state benefits to a reduction
in SO2 emissions have only one-third the impact of in-state benefits.191
Professors Lipscomb and Mobarak assess pollution in rivers at
upstream and downstream locations in Brazil.192 The authors analyze
quarterly data on BOD levels from several hundred monitoring
stations during the timeframe from 1990 to 2007. The importance of
spillovers on pollution levels are investigated by measuring the
distance of each station from its nearest upstream and downstream
border. While generally such distances may be endogenous, Brazil
frequently redraws its jurisdictional boundaries allowing the authors
to exploit only the temporal variation in the distance of a given
station to its nearest borders.193 Lipscomb and Mobarak find
meaningful evidence that spillovers matter. As the distance to the
nearest downstream border falls from ten to nine kilometers, say,
pollution increases by 1.3%; pollution rises by 1.9% as distance falls
from one kilometer to zero (zero represents the point at the actual
border).194 Thus, BOD levels rise at an increasing rate as the river
approaches its downstream border. In further analysis, the authors
examine pairs of station monitors and find that BOD levels at the
189. Id. at 516–21.
190. Id. at 528 (“The results for plants near the Canadian border suggest
different impacts for different pollutants. On the water pollution side we
observe more BOD pollution and fewer inspections. On the air pollution
side we observe less SO2 pollution and more enforcement actions. This
focus on SO2 emissions is consistent with the substantial political
attention paid to acid rain caused by SO2 emissions from US plants in
the AQA treaty.”).
191. Id. at 530.
192. Molly Lipscomb & Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, Decentralization and
Pollution Spillovers: Evidence from the Re-drawing of County Borders
in Brazil (Feb. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/mushfiqmobarak/papers/decentralization.
pdf.
193. Id. at 18–20.
194. Id. at 22 (“Ten kilometers from the border, pollution increases at a rate
of 1.3% per kilometer, whereas 1 kilometer from the border it increases
at a rate of 1.9%.”).
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downstream monitor, relative to BOD levels at the upstream monitor,
are 3.1% higher per jurisdictional boundary that the river crosses
between the two stations.195
In more recent work, Hatfield and Kosec exploit the variation in
the number of counties spanned by U.S. metropolitan areas to
determine if areas divided across more counties experience greater
pollution.196 Because division into multiple jurisdictions may not be
random, the authors exploit jurisdictional boundaries caused by the
presence of streams in order to isolate the causal effect of the number
of jurisdictions on pollution.197 Pollution is measured using the average
of the EPA’s Air Quality Index over the years between 1999 and
2002, as well as the ambient concentrations of several individual
pollutants.198 Finally, the authors also examine the effect of increasing
the number of jurisdictions within a metropolitan area on drinking
water quality using data from the EPA’s Safe Drinking Water
Information System database. Since drinking water is a local good,
the authors did not expect to find any effect of jurisdictional
boundaries on this outcome.199 The results indicate a sizeable effect of
increasing the number of counties within an area on air pollution.200
For example, changing a metropolitan area from being entirely
contained in one county to split among two counties worsened air
quality by half a standard deviation and added an additional thirteen
days per year where the air is considered unhealthy.201 Moreover,
Hatfield and Kosec find that a similar increase from one to two
counties within a metropolitan area increases the concentrations of
carcinogenic pollutants by anywhere from nineteen percent to 250%,
depending on the pollutant.202 However, the authors found no effect
on drinking water quality, consistent with their results being driven
by interjurisdictional externalities.203

195. Id. at 25 (“For each additional border crossed, pollution increases by
3.1%.”).
196. John William Hatfield & Katrina Kosec, Local Environmental Quality
and Inter-Jurisdictional Spillovers 2, 10–16 (Apr. 17, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/katrina_kosec/19/.
197. Id. at 8–10.
198. Id. at 11.
199. See id. at 3 (“As a placebo analysis, we examine the effects of having
more jurisdictions on public drinking water quality. This is a local,
environmental, publicly-provided good without significant spillovers.”).
200. Id. at 20.
201. Id. at 18.
202. Id. at 20.
203. Id. at 22.
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Professors Kahn, Li, and Zhao assess river pollution in China,
taking advantage of a unique natural experiment.204 Using data from
2004 to 2010, the authors assess relative pollution levels at internal
versus border locations.205 Beginning in 2005, the central government
began monitoring local compliance with environmental targets related
to the chemical oxygen demand (COD) of rivers. Compliance became
a criterion upon which the political promotion of local officials is
based. Prior to 2005, local officials had little incentive to reduce river
pollution near jurisdictional boundaries. After 2005, this is no longer
the case for officials seeking promotion.206 However, other pollutants
besides COD are not a part of the promotion criteria. Using pollution
data from 499 river monitoring stations located in China’s seven
major rivers, the authors find that the 2005 change reduced COD
levels. Moreover, the decline was greater at border locations,
consistent with significant transboundary pollution prior to 2005.207
Finally, the authors find no impact of the promotion criteria on other
measures of pollution.208
Other studies pursue very different strategies for assessing the
importance of interjurisdictional externalities. Banzhaf and Chupp
present a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector,
incorporating NOx and SO2 emissions.209 They then compare the level
of welfare achieved under a first-best policy where each state fully
internalizes all transboundary pollution damages, a second-best
uniform policy across all states, and the decentralized case where each
states acts only in its best interest. The results indicate that social
welfare is only 0.2% lower under the second-best uniform policy
204. Matthew E. Kahn, Pei Li & Daxuan Zhao, Pollution Control Effort at
China’s River Borders: When Does Free Riding Cease? (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19620, 2013), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19620.
205. Id. at 11–14.
206. See id. at 3 (“In 2005, the central government changed the rules of the
game and provided local officials with strong incentives to reduce
specific indicators of water pollution along rivers that flow within. For
local officials, who sought to be promoted within the Chinese political
promotion system, compliance with these new environmental targets
motivated them to cease free riding at boundaries.”).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 19 (“We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that
local governors have responded to the new promotion rules by taking
more effort to reduce water pollution at political boundaries. Our study
also points out a fault of the current system. Local governors focus on
the environmental measures set by central government rather than a
broader set of water criteria that might be more relevant for public
health . . . .” (citation omitted)).
209. Banzhaf & Chupp, supra note 31, at 454–57.
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compared to the first-best policy.210 However, the decentralized case
with self-interested states results in a 31.5% reduction in social
welfare.211 This discrepancy does not arise due to a lack of preference
heterogeneity across states. Rather, the welfare cost of ignoring such
heterogeneity under the second-best uniform policy is swamped by the
welfare cost of failing to internalize the pollution externalities.212
Evidence of the magnitude of the externality is further provided by
Chupp in separate work. He illustrates for two states, Arizona and
North Carolina, that the in-state marginal benefit per ton of SO2
reduction is only about one-fourth the marginal benefit to the nation
as a whole.213 Banzhaf and Chupp conclude that “inter-jurisdictional
spillovers appear to be a bigger problem in this application than
heterogeneous benefits.”214
Lastly, Perino and Talavera assess the determinants of state
sulfur emissions rate standards prior to the Acid Rain Program in
1995.215 In particular, the authors are interested in the relative
importance of the internal costs and benefits of reduced emissions
versus the external benefits on the state emissions standard. The state
sulfur standard is measured by pounds of SO2 per million British
thermal units (MMBtu). The marginal cost of a more stringent
standard is proxied by the transportation costs incurred to import
low-sulfur coal from Wyoming. Finally, internal and external benefits
to emissions reductions are measured by the state’s own acidity of
rainwater and the average acidity of rainwater in northeastern states
(for states located in the Midwest). The results indicate that marginal
abatement costs and internal and external benefits matter in a
statistical sense. However, the effect of a state’s own acidity is more

210. Id. at 458 (“More surprising is that the second-best uniform policy
achieves benefits of $59.6 billion, a loss of only 0.2% of the first-best
benefits!”).
211. See id. (“More to the point, the states on their own are estimated to
achieve national net benefits of $40.9 billion, simply acting out of their
own self-interest. This is a loss of 31.5% of the total potential benefits,
which is substantial . . . .”).
212. See id. at 462.
213. B. Andrew Chupp, Environmental Constituent Interest, Green
Electricity Policies, and Legislative Voting, 62 J. Envtl. Econ. &
Mgmt. 254, 256 (2011).
214. Banzhaf & Chupp, supra note 31, at 450.
215. Grischa Perino & Olena Talavera, The Benefits of Spatially
Differentiated Regulation: The Response to Acid Rain by U.S. States
Prior to the Acid Rain Program, 96 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 108, 110–16
(2014).
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than twenty times larger than the effect of the acidity of rainwater in
the northeast.216
Rather than focusing on pollution, several empirical studies test
for the presence of spillover effects on enforcement of environmental
regulations. Gray and Shadbegian, in the study of 409 paper and pulp
establishments in the United States discussed earlier in this Part,217
also examine determinants of the number of air and water pollution
inspections and enforcement actions.218 The results are generally
weaker than their reported results pertaining to emissions.219
Nonetheless, the authors find some evidence that air pollution
enforcement actions are higher against establishments near the
Canadian border (consistent with the lower SO2 emissions found in
the analysis), but fewer water pollution inspections take place against
such plants.220
In a subsequent study, Gray and Shadbegian use emissions data
from 1997 on 521 U.S. manufacturing plants located within fifty miles
of the center of three cities located near state borders (St. Louis,
Cincinnati, and Charlotte).221 The primary purpose of the study is to
examine the effect of prior environmental enforcement—against either
oneself (so-called specific deterrence) or against other plants within
ten miles (so-called general deterrence)—on subsequent plant-level
emissions. However, a very interesting finding emerges: inspections of
other plants within ten miles reduce a plant’s own emissions of air
toxics (obtained from the TRI) as long as those other plants are
located within the same state. Inspections of other nearby plants,
which are located in another jurisdiction, fail to produce any general
deterrent effect.222 In this case, the lack of a spillover across
216. See id. at 117 (“The severity of the acid rain problem in the Northeast
affected regulation in the Midwest, which is in line with the main interstate externality for acid rain in the United States. The positive sign of
the coefficient confirms that states at least partially internalized this
externality (i.e., lower pH level in the Northeast tightened emission
standards in the Midwest). However, the effect is by more than an order
of magnitude weaker than the effect of a state’s own exposure to acid
rain.”).
217. See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text.
218. See Gray & Shadbegian, supra note 188, at 518.
219. See id. at 532 (“The results for the regulatory activity equations are
generally less consistent with our hypotheses than those for the
emissions equations.”).
220. See id. at 525–28.
221. Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, The Environmental
Performance of Polluting Plants: A Spatial Analysis, 47 J. Regional
Sci. 63, 69–71 (2007).
222. See id. at 80 (“Turning to the importance of jurisdictional boundaries
for regulatory analyses, the negative sign on INSPNBOUT shows that
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jurisdictional boundaries reduces welfare. If enforcement were instead
the responsibility of a higher level of government, each inspection
would result in a greater reduction in emissions through general
deterrence.
More recently, Professors Konisky and Woods assessed the impact
of proximity to jurisdictional borders on plant-level enforcement
actions.223 Data on state-led enforcement actions—inspections, total
punitive actions, and formal punitive actions—under the CAA
between 1990 and 2000 are aggregated to the county-level and used to
determine if counties on state or international borders are subject to
less enforcement. The results indicate approximate twenty-five
percent and fifty percent reductions in the count of inspections in
counties bordering Canada and Mexico, respectively, but no
meaningful effect in counties bordering other states.224
In a follow-up study, Konisky and Woods utilize data from the
EPA’s Integrated Database for Enforcement Analysis to assess the
determinants of enforcement actions—compliance monitoring and
punitive actions—against roughly 6400 facilities regulated under the
Clean Water Act from 1995 to 2005.225 The importance of spillovers is
assessed by examining whether a facility that discharges its effluent
into an interstate river or a multi-state watershed is the subject of
less enforcement action. The authors also assess, among other things,
the impact of distance to the nearest downstream state from the point
where a facility’s effluent likely enters a river. Konisky and Woods fail
to find any evidence consistent with fewer enforcement actions being
taken against firms more likely to be responsible for transboundary

inspections on plants in neighboring states are not as effective at
improving compliance. In fact, the negative coefficient on INSPNBOUT
is larger in magnitude than the positive one on INSPNB, so increased
inspections at plants in neighboring states would be predicted to reduce
a plant’s compliance, although this effect is not statistically
significant.”).
223. David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Exporting Air Pollution?
Regulatory Enforcement and Environmental Free Riding in the United
States, 63 Pol. Res. Q. 771, 774–76 (2010).
224. See id. at 779 (“[T]his represents about 25 percent and 50 percent fewer
inspections for counties bordering Canada and Mexico, respectively.”);
see also id. at 778 (“[W]e do not find evidence that states attempt to
export their pollution across interstate borders or to oceans or the Great
Lakes through lax regulatory enforcement of facilities in border
counties.”).
225. David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Environmental Free Riding in
State Water Pollution Enforcement, 12 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 227, 233–
39 (2012).
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pollution.226 Thus, the empirical studies to date assessing the spatial
and temporal variation in enforcement behavior indicate less free
riding than those assessing pollution directly. Understanding the
source(s) of this difference is necessary.
The final set of papers examining the empirical relevance of
resource externalities assess the impact of decentralized decision
making on the exploitation of shared resources. Professor McWhinnie
analyzes data on the global exploitation status of various fish stock
according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1994
and 2002.227 Specifically, the FAO designates each fish stock in fifteen
regions as underexploited, moderately exploited, fully exploited,
overexploited, depleted, or recovering. The author then examines
whether the number of countries that report catching a given fish in a
given region and year help predict the exploitation status of the fish
stock. McWhinnie finds that exploitation is increasing in the number
of countries accessing the fish stock.228 For example, if the fish stock is
shared by two countries rather than one, “it is 9% more likely to be
overfished and 19% more likely to be depleted.”229 If the fish stock is
shared by five countries rather than one, “it is 36% more likely to be
overfished and 82% more likely to be depleted.”230
The analysis by Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov, and Sieber is
similar to that by Hatfield and Kosec in that it explores the impact of
dividing a given geographic area into a larger number of jurisdictions
on the environment.231 However, Burgess, Hansen, Olken, Potapov,
and Sieber examine the impact of the number of administrative
jurisdictions in a given Indonesian province on the rate of
deforestation between 2001 and 2008.232 The results indicate nearly a
four percent increase in the annual rate of deforestation if an

226. See id. at 240 (“Looking across the models for inspections and punitive
actions, the absence of any statistically discernable border effects is
striking.”).
227. Stephanie F. McWhinnie, The Tragedy of the Commons in International
Fisheries: An Empirical Examination, 57 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt.
321, 323–26 (2009).
228. See id. at 327 (“The number of countries is statistically significant at
the 5% level and works in the anticipated direction; the more countries
a fish stock is shared between, the more likely it is to be overexploited
or depleted.”).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 327–28.
231. Robin Burgess, Matthew Hansen, Benjamin A. Olken, Peter Potapov &
Stefanie Sieber, The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics,
127 Q.J. Econ. 1707, 1714–30 (2012).
232. Id. at 1715.
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additional district is formed within a province.233 The authors
conclude that their analysis provides a “counterexample to those who
argue that decentralization of control over natural resources in weakly
governed tropical environments should enhance their conservation.”234
2.

Pecuniary Externalities

The second category of externalities includes pecuniary
externalities. This refers to situations where jurisdictions ignore the
ramifications of their actions on prices in other areas. However,
empirical evidence regarding pecuniary externalities is rare. One
source of pecuniary externalities, in theory, is referred to as tax
exporting and dates back at least to Gordon.235 This refers to localities
levying excessive taxes in situations where at least a portion of the
tax bill is paid by nonresidents (for example, hospitality taxes). In the
context of environmental regulation, environment importing (as
opposed to tax exporting) can arise in either of two ways. First, a
jurisdiction may enact excessive regulation if producers of polluting
goods are located in other jurisdictions as long as the costs cannot be
passed fully onto consumers located in the jurisdiction. Second, a
jurisdiction where the pollution-generating production of goods occurs
may enact excessive regulation if producers are able to pass at least a
portion of the regulatory costs onto consumers in other jurisdictions.
Anecdotal evidence of the first type of behavior is found in a
paper by Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian. The authors provide a
historical account of the development of the Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act of 1965.236 This was the first statute to provide
the federal government with regulatory power over air pollution. The
233. See id. at 1734 (reporting that “the annual rate of deforestation
increases by 3.85% if an additional district is formed within a
province”).
234. Id. at 1751.
235. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 580 (noting that decentralization can lead
to inefficient outcomes due to externalities, one of which is the
imposition of taxes on nonresidents). Another type of pecuniary
externality is what Hall refers to as psychological externalities. This is
the case where resources within one jurisdiction are valued by residents
of another jurisdiction. Unique natural elements, such as Old Faithful,
are primary examples. Destruction of such resources by the jurisdiction
in which the resource is located can be thought of as imposing a
pecuniary externality on residents of other jurisdictions as the price of
utilizing (or visiting) the resource becomes infinite. See Hall, supra note
156, at 57; see also Esty, supra note 158, at 594–97 (discussing the
psychological externalities that people outside of the “regulating
jurisdiction” may suffer and deeming it a “choice of public” issue).
236. Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 202(a), 79 Stat. 992 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (2012)). For the authors’ historical account of this Act,
see Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 14, at 330–31.
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legislation was supported by the automobile industry, not because it
favored reducing pollution, but rather because several states had
adopted or were in the process of adopting stringent regulations
regarding automobile emissions.237 Since the production of automobiles
is geographically concentrated in a few areas, the costs of these
regulations were born predominantly by nonresidents.238 Thus, prior
to the passage of the federal statute, states were importing a cleaner
environment at the expense of nonresidents.
This history is repeating itself as states are once again pursuing
regulations on automobile emissions for the purposes of achieving
greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions. Professor Rabe writes:
Still another state economic development incentive may relate
to policy opportunities that, in effect, will shift most of the
compliance costs to other jurisdictions. California’s alliance
with other states pursuing vehicle emissions reductions can be
considered through this lens, as none of these jurisdictions host
large vehicle manufacturing sectors that might be jeopardized
through
aggressive
transition
toward
lower-emission
vehicles. . . . In turn, some of the proponent states were
actively developing next-generation vehicle technology within
their boundaries that might receive a boost through a
regulatory burden imposed on conventional vehicles generally
manufactured elsewhere.239
Professors McAusland and Millimet provide indirect evidence of
environmental importing by subnational jurisdictions.240 The authors
use data on trade among U.S. states, among Canadian provinces, and
between U.S. states and Canadian provinces from 1997 and 2002 to
explore the effect of intranational and international trade on emissions
reported in the TRI for the United States and the Canadian National
Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI).241 McAusland and Millimet show
theoretically that environmental regulation should become more
237. See Elliott, Ackerman, & Millian, supra note 14, at 330 (providing that
California had adopted new regulations, and that Pennsylvania and New
York were considering doing so).
238. See id. (“The automobile industry is in a very different strategic
position, however, because it is geographically concentrated and its
product, not its factories, is the main source of its pollution.”).
239. Barry Rabe, Contested Federalism and American Climate Policy, 41
Publius: J. Federalism 494, 502 (2011).
240. Carol McAusland & Daniel L. Millimet, Do National Borders Matter?
Intranational Trade, International Trade, and the Environment, 65 J.
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 411 (2013).
241. Id. at 423–26.
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stringent as trade increases because the resulting higher prices on
locally produced goods are passed on to consumers in other
jurisdictions.242 Moreover, because environmental regulation in the
United States and Canada is a mix of centralized and decentralized
control, the effect on regulatory stringency should be stronger when
higher prices are passed onto foreign consumers.243 Thus, the
theoretical model predicts that international trade should result in
greater reductions in emissions than intranational trade. The authors’
findings are consistent with the idea of environment importing.244
Professors Chakravorty, Nauges, and Thomas provide additional
evidence of price spillovers due to decentralized environmental policy
making.245 The authors examine the effect of clean fuel programs
permitted under the CAA. Under the Act, states are permitted to
implement their own clean fuel program for gasoline in an effort to
reduce air pollution. The result is a proliferation of clean fuel blends;
at least fifteen different fuel specifications are in use, which—when
combined with three different octane levels—yield more than fortyfive unique blends.246 The authors examine the temporal and spatial
variation in wholesale gasoline prices across states between 1995 and
2002 due to the required usage of so-called “boutique fuels.”247
242. See id. at 412 (“In regions that import actively, the majority of goods in
a household’s consumption basket is produced abroad. Since the price of
these imported goods depends on foreign supply conditions, overall
consumption will be relatively unaffected by changes in local
environmental regulation. Moreover, in actively exporting regions, much
of consumers’ share of the regulatory burden falls largely on foreigners.
In effect, trade partly decouples consumer welfare from the costs of local
regulation, leading to stricter environmental regulation in states that
trade intensely.”).
243. See id. (“[T]he extent to which trade decouples consumption from
regulation is substantially weaker for intranational trade, suggesting
that the ceteris paribus effect of intranational trade on the environment
will be smaller than of international trade.”)
244. Id. at 434 (“Our results indicate that international trade generates
statistically, and economically, significant benefits for the environment.
On the other hand, intranational trade has a statistically and
economically significant, adverse effect on the environment.”).
245. Ujjayant Chakravorty, Céline Nauges & Alban Thomas, Clean Air
Regulation and Heterogeneity in US Gasoline Prices, 55 J. Envtl.
Econ. & Mgmt. 106 (2008).
246. Id. at 106–07 (“At least 15 different types of fuel specifications are
currently in use. Combined with the three octane grades of gasoline
available at pumps—regular, mid-grade and premium—over 45 different
blends are used nationwide. A new ozone rule proposed by the EPA is
expected to add another 24 new blends into the mix in the near future.
These fuels are often called ‘boutique fuels.’”).
247. See id. at 119–20.
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Specifically, the authors estimate not only the direct effect on prices
due to requirement of a cleaner gasoline blend, but also the indirect
effect of market segmentation.248 In other words, as the type of fuel
required in one state becomes more distinct from the type of fuel
required in neighboring states, prices should rise due to greater
demands placed on refineries.249 The results confirm not only that the
market segmentation effect is important, but that it is nearly as
important as the direct cost effect.250 If a state changes from no
gasoline regulation to requiring clean fuel (of the type considered in
the analysis) for the entire state, wholesale gasoline prices are
expected to rise by sixteen percent.251 On the other hand, if a state
transitions from requiring the same fuel as its neighbors to a
completely unique blend not used by any of its neighbors, wholesale
gasoline prices are expected to rise by at least fourteen percent.252 To
the extent that states do not take into account the higher prices
occurring elsewhere when a state decides to require a unique fuel
blend and thus increases its “regulatory distance” from its neighbors,
decentralization in this case will lead to excessive heterogeneity in
fuel blends.253
248. Id. at 113.
249. This is related to the general argument concerning uniform product
standards as a rationale for centralization. See, e.g., Silvana
Dalmazzone, Decentralization and the Environment, in Handbook of
Fiscal Federalism 459, 466 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio eds.,
2006) (“[L]ocally differentiated environmental regulations in some cases
may translate themselves in differences in product standards and in a
consequent fragmentation of the market . . . .”); Oates, supra note 4, at
21 (“A second role for central government can arise in cases where
standardization in pollution-control activities across jurisdictions
involves large cost savings. The most obvious case here involves the
determination of emissions standards for motor vehicles. It would
obviously be very costly for auto manufacturers to have to produce 50
different variants of cars to satisfy the particular emissions standards of
each state.”); Adler, supra note 9, at 148 (“[C]onsumers may benefit
from national product standards, insofar as lower compliance costs
result in lower consumer prices.”); Esty, supra note 158, at 618 (“In
some circumstances uniform standards may be welfare enhancing. When
environmental regulations are focused on products (as opposed to
production processes), harmonization across jurisdictions can create
important economies of scale for the businesses selling these products
and for the states administering environmental controls.” (citation
omitted)).
250. See Chakravorty, Nauges & Thomas, supra note 245, at 117 (“This
segmentation effect is found to be highly significant for both the RFG
and OXY markets.”).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 118.
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In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that localities ignore
interjurisdictional externalities related to transboundary pollution and
resource exploitation and these externalities entail significant welfare
loss. The evidence is less convincing when enforcement of
environmental regulations is examined. However, the inability of the
general deterrent effect of local enforcement to cross political
boundaries is noteworthy. Finally, some evidence exists suggesting
that localities ignore the impact of their policies on the prices paid
and the profits earned by nonresidents. More empirical evidence on
the prevalence of tax exporting (or environment importing) is needed.
3.

Fiscal Externalities

The final category of externalities is referred to as fiscal
externalities—a holdover from the fiscal federalism literature.
However, Wilson defines fiscal externalities more broadly as instances
where the policy choices of one jurisdiction have effects on the policy
choices of other jurisdictions through strategic policy making.254 Thus,
the presence of such externalities violates the assumptions required for
decentralized policy making to be efficient just as in the case of
resource or pecuniary externalities. Konisky writes: “The economic
efficiency results emerge from local regulators making decisions solely
based on intrajurisdictional, not interjurisdictional, factors.”255
Brueckner provides an excellent introduction to the notion of
strategic interactions between governments.256 Such interactions may
arise for three reasons. First, jurisdictions are, or are perceived to be,
in competition for mobile resources. Second, policies in one
jurisdiction lead to spillovers (for example, transboundary pollution)
that alter the payoffs to different policies in other jurisdictions. Third,
voters may judge the performance of policy makers through
interjurisdictional comparisons, thereby creating a situation referred
to as yardstick competition.257
Before discussing the existing empirical evidence on strategic
interaction, three comments are warranted. First, all three sources of
strategic interaction are empirically equivalent in that each predicts
that the policy choices of one jurisdiction depend on the choices of
other jurisdictions.258 Thus, without more information, differentiating
among the underlying causes is not possible.

254. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 272.
255. David M. Konisky, Assessing U.S. State Susceptibility to Environmental
Regulatory Competition, 9 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 404, 406 (2009).
256. See Brueckner, supra note 159.
257. See id. at 176–81.
258. See id. at 182 (“[B]oth the spillover and resource-flow models of
strategic interaction generate reaction functions, which relate each
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Second, whether strategic interactions occur depends upon policy
maker perceptions.259 For example, if resources—people or capital—
are immobile, but policy makers mistakenly believe that resources are
mobile, then strategic interactions may occur. However, if resources
are mobile but policy makers naively assume they are not, then
strategic interactions may be absent. Thus, the question of whether
governments act strategically is fundamentally distinct from the
question of resource mobility (and, similarly, the presence of actual
spillovers or yardstick competition).260
Third, strategic interaction is not synonymous with a race-to-thebottom. In theory, strategic interaction may lead to decentralized
policies that are inefficiently lax or inefficiently stringent (referred to
as a race-to-the-top).261 That said, one of the most common
justifications given for centralization of environmental policy making
is fear over a race-to-the-bottom. Engel states: “Of the numerous
theoretical rationales used to justify federal environmental regulation,
perhaps the most broadly compelling is the argument that without
such regulation, states would engage in a welfare-reducing ‘race-tothe-bottom’ in environmental standard-setting.”262 Professors List and
Gerking argue that “in a second-best world in which initial distortions
are present, locally determined environmental regulations are likely to
be suboptimal when jurisdictions compete with each other to attract

jurisdiction’s chosen [decision variable] to its own characteristics and to
the choices of other jurisdictions.”).
259. Daniel L. Millimet & Vasudha Rangaprasad, Strategic Competition
Amongst Public Schools, 37 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 199, 204
(2007) (“[W]hat is relevant is the perception among the administrative
units . . . .”).
260. See Esty, supra note 158, at 573 (“While economists downplay fears of a
race to the bottom, politicians cannot escape the image, in Ross Perot’s
memorable words, of a ‘giant sucking sound’ as U.S. factories and jobs
go down the drain to jurisdictions with more lax environmental
standards and lower compliance costs.” (quoting Ross Perot, Save
Your Job, Save Our Country 41 (1993))); see also Oates, supra
note 4, at 16 (“In fact, irrespective of the actual facts on the location
decisions in polluting industries, whether or not officials use
environmental regulations for competitive purposes depends largely on
perceptions. If policymakers think that these regulations matter, then
they may well craft environmental legislation in the light of their
objectives for economic development. Perceptions matter here.”).
261. See Brueckner, supra note 159, at 177 (“Theory is silent regarding the
sign of the reaction function’s slope.”); Engel, supra note 64, at 346
(referring to the implication of strategic interaction as simply a “race to
inefficiency” and highlighting the irrelevance of whether the race is
actually to the top or the bottom if one simply cares about efficiency).
262. Engel, supra note 64, at 274.
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capital.”263 Konisky states: “A principal objection to decentralization
of environmental regulatory authority to subnational governments in
federal systems is the concern that it will result in a ‘race to
the bottom.’”264
The empirical literature on strategic interaction can be parsed
into two strands. The first examines the impact of decentralization on
pollution levels directly, using temporal variation in the level of
centralization. The second directly estimates so-called spatial reaction
functions to determine if policy choices in one jurisdiction are affected
by the choices of other jurisdiction. A subset of this group pushes the
analysis further in an attempt to determine if strategic interaction, to
the extent it exists, is consistent with a race to the bottom or a race
to the top.
Within the first strand, several empirical papers have used
President Ronald Reagan’s swift devolution of many aspects of
environmental policy—referred to as new federalism—as a natural
experiment from which to form indirect inferences concerning the
race-to-the-bottom hypothesis.265 List and Gerking utilize state-level
data on pollution abatement expenditures by manufacturing
industries obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures over the
period from 1973 to 1990, as well as state-level emissions data on SO2
and NOx from the EPA over the period from 1929 to 1994.266 The
objective is to determine if there were shifts in the levels of these
variables in the mid-1980s after controlling for other potential
determinants of abatement and emissions. In terms of abatement
expenditures, the authors find mixed evidence as expenditures were
found to increase in some sectors and decrease in others.267 There is no
evidence that emissions worsened after the early 1980s and some
evidence that SO2 emissions declined.268

263. John A. List & Shelby Gerking, Regulatory Federalism and
Environmental Protection in the United States, 40 J. Regional Sci.
453, 453 (2000).
264. David M. Konisky, Regulatory Competition and Environmental
Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
853, 853 (2007).
265. See, e.g., Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact of
Environmental Federalism, 43 J. Regional Sci. 711, 714–16 (2003)
(providing a detailed description of the changes implemented under
President Reagan).
266. See List & Gerking, supra note 263, at 456–59.
267. See id. at 462–63 (indicating that abatement tended to increase for the
chemical and allieds and food and kindred product sectors).
268. See id. at 467 (“Results for sulfur dioxides indicate that emissions net of
real per capita income growth tended to decline after 1982.”).
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Two follow-up studies utilize the same data as by List and
Gerking but apply alternative econometric techniques. In a different
study, Millimet and List compare the entire distribution of emissions
and abatement expenditures across states before and after President
Reagan’s new federalism policies.269 This allows the authors to
investigate the possibility of finer changes in these variables that may
have been overlooked in List and Gerking. Millimet and List find
stronger evidence of a reduction in emissions and increase in
abatement efforts in the 1980s.270 In another study, Millimet allows for
the determinants of emissions and abatement to have differential
effects over time and then tests for any residual effect of President
Reagan’s new federalism policies.271 He finds little meaningful
association between the decentralization of the 1980s and emissions,
but does find a positive association with abatement expenditures.272
Fomby and Lin perform a similar analysis.273 The authors use
time series data on aggregate emissions of SO2, NOx, and volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) in the United States from 1940 to 1998 to
test for a structural break where the possible date of any break is
unknown.274 The results point to structural breaks for all three
pollutants (where the breaks represent the start of downward trends).
However, the breaks occur in the late 1960s or 1970s, corresponding
to the beginning of the environmental movement in the United
States.275 There is no meaningful evidence of further breaks during the
Reagan era.276
269. Daniel L. Millimet & John A. List, A Natural Experiment on the “Race
to the Bottom” Hypothesis: Testing for Stochastic Dominance in
Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 Oxford Bull. Econ. & Stat. 395,
398–403 (2003).
270. See id. at 418 (“Our findings strongly reject the notion that a race to
the bottom materialized for these three indicators when Reagan greatly
expanded the discretionary power of states in the determination of
environmental policy in the US during the 1980s.”).
271. See Millimet, supra note 265, at 716–19.
272. See id. at 731 (“The results are striking, suggesting that environmental
decentralization did instigate a race to the top in pollution control
expenditures by the mid-1980s when the financial position of states
improved. Nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions results are less
conclusive, but suggest that environmental decentralization may have
halted the deterioration of air quality that began in the 1970s.”).
273. Thomas B. Fomby & Limin Lin, A Change Point Analysis of the Impact
of “Environmental Federalism” on Aggregate Air Quality in the United
States: 1940–98, 44 Econ. Inquiry 109, 113–14 (2006).
274. Id. at 112–14.
275. See id. at 118 (“Although it is impossible to attribute the occurrence of
the change points of these series to any one federal legislative act, one
might surmise, given the proximity of the change points, that the Air
Quality Act of 1967, the Clean Air Act of 1970, and the 1977

1720

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·201
Environmental Federalism

Related to Fomby and Lin is the analysis by Professors Bulte,
List, and Strazicich.277 Here, the authors examine a related, but
distinct, question. In particular, the authors are interested in whether
emissions levels are converging across states over time and whether
such convergence accelerated after the 1970s. Thus, the authors are
not concerned with the Reagan era per se, but rather the general era
of relative federal involvement in environmental policy making
beginning in 1970. Data on SO2 and NOx from the EPA between 1929
and 1999 are examined.278 The results indicate that emissions were
converging across some states prior to 1970 and across many more
states after 1970.279 While it is not obvious if this analysis offers much
guidance regarding the realization of a race to the bottom, the results
are consistent with federal involvement since 1970s leading to more
homogeneity across states.
Two final studies address related questions. Potoski assesses
whether U.S. states have chosen to adopt air quality standards in
excess of that required by the federal government.280 Data came from
the State Air Pollution Control Survey conducted in 1998.281 Thirtyeight states responded to the survey. Eleven of the thirty-eight states
indicated that the state standards exceed the EPA’s ambient air
quality standards for at least one of the six criteria pollutant.282 Eight
states reported adopting new source performance standards that are
more stringent than required by the EPA.283 Potoski interprets this as
amendments to the Clean Air Act played important roles in changing
the trends of the SO2 and VOC series from positive to negative and at
least arresting the positive trend of the NOX series.”).
276. See id. (“With respect to the effect of Reagan’s environmental
federalism on the trends in the NOX, SO2, or VOC series, in none of
them did there occur any additional change points after the initial
change point occurred.”).
277. Erwin Bulte, John A. List & Mark C. Strazicich, Regulatory Federalism
and the Distribution of Air Pollutant Emissions, 47 J. Regional Sci.
155 (2007).
278. See id. at 155–57.
279. See id. at 157.
280. See Matthew Potoski, Clean Air Federalism: Do States Race to the
Bottom?, 61 Pub. Admin. Rev. 335 (2001).
281. See id. at 335.
282. Id. at 337 (“[F]ive states (13 percent) reported that their standard for
one of the NAAQS pollutants exceeds the USEPA’s minimum criteria,
and six states (16 percent) reported standards exceeding NAAQS
criteria for two or more pollutants. Thus, nearly one-third (29 percent)
of the responding states have one or more ambient air standards that
exceed USEPA requirements.”).
283. Id.
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“no evidence of a race to the bottom.”284 Oates is less optimistic,
writing that “with a couple of minor exceptions . . . environmental
authorities have not adopted standards for these pollutants that are
more stringent than the federal standards.”285 That said, Oates does
not interpret this as evidence of a race to the bottom; he explains this
by the “extraordinarily stringent” federal standards.286
Chang, Sigman, and Traub examine state applications for
“authorization” or “primacy” status287 under both the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act288 (RCRA) and the Clean Water Act
(CWA). As of 2002, forty-five states have authorization under the
CWA and forty-eight states have authorization under the RCRA.289
The authors explore the determinants of how quickly states were
authorized in the two cases. The results indicate that states with
more “green” preferences—measured by the average League of
Conservation Voters environmental scores for a state’s federal
congressmen—authorize significantly sooner.290 The authors infer that
“states seek authorization in order to adopt stricter rather than
weaker environmental policies than the federal government.”291
The preceding studies do not suggest a race to the bottom.
However, they do not shed any light on whether decentralization
leads to an efficient outcome or to a race to the top. Levinson states:
“The important question is more subtle than whether emissions go up
or down. It is whether interjurisdictional competition and the Reagan
decentralization caused regulations to be laxer than if they had been
set by a welfare maximizing central planner.”292 Thus, the second
strand of the literature tests for evidence of strategic policy making
by jurisdictions. Brueckner provides an excellent, general overview of
the theoretical and empirical literature concerned with strategic
interactions between governments.293 Not only does he provide an
introduction to the spatial econometric techniques employed to test
284. Id. at 339.
285. Oates, supra note 4, at 13.
286. Id.
287. Howard F. Chang, Hilary Sigman & Leah G. Traub, Endogenous
Decentralization in Federal Environmental Policies, 37 Int’l Rev. L. &
Econ. 39 (2014).
288. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901
(2012)).
289. Chang, Sigman & Traub, supra at note 287, at 41.
290. Id. at 49.
291. Id.
292. Levinson, supra note 10, at 97.
293. See Brueckner, supra note 159.
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for strategic behavior, but he also discusses studies examining other
policy areas such as welfare benefits and taxation.294 Thus, this Article
focuses exclusively on papers looking at environmental issues.
Murdoch, Rahmatian, and Thayer use data on public recreation
expenditures per acre of recreation land across eighty-five
communities in the Los Angeles metropolitan area in 1987.295 The
authors are motivated by the question of whether communities free
ride by reducing their own expenditures when neighboring
communities’ expenditures increase. Instead, they find the opposite;
community expenditures increase by roughly $1000 if neighboring
expenditures increase by $2700.296 This is consistent with a model of
yardstick competition or competition for mobile households.
Brueckner tests for strategic interaction using an index of growth
controls across 173 California cities in 1988.297 The index reflects the
number of measures adopted that are designed to constrain
population or construction growth. Brueckner finds meaningful
evidence of positive strategic interaction; more stringent growth
controls in a city lead to more stringent controls in neighboring
jurisdictions.298
Fredriksson and Millimet test for strategic interaction across the
forty-eight contiguous states using two measures of environmental
regulation over the period from 1977 to 1986 and 1988 to 1994.299
First—as in Fredriksson, List, and Millimet—the authors use an index
based on the ratio of actual pollution abatement expenditures
incurred by plants located in the state to the predicted level of
expenditures based on the state’s industrial composition.300 Second,
294. Id. Subsequent research tests for the presence of strategic interactions in
U.S. educational policy making as well. See, e.g., Millimet &
Rangaprasad, supra note 259; Daniel L. Millimet & Trevor Collier,
Efficiency in Public Schools: Does Competition Matter?, 145 J.
Econometrics 134 (2008).
295. James C. Murdoch, Morteza Rahmatian & Mark A. Thayer, A Spatially
Autoregressive Median Voter Model of Recreation Expenditures, 21
Pub. Fin. Q. 334, 341–43 (1993).
296. See id. at 347.
297. Jan K. Brueckner, Testing for Strategic Interaction Among Local
Governments: The Case of Growth Controls, 44 J. Urb. Econ. 438,
448–50 (1998).
298. See id. at 458 (“This finding provides evidence of spatial interaction in
the choice of growth controls. The positive coefficients indicate
that . . . cities’ reaction functions are upward sloping, so that the
decision variables are strategic complements.”).
299. Per G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Strategic Interaction and the
Determination of Environmental Policy Across U.S. States, 51 J. Urb.
Econ. 101 (2002).
300. See id. at 109–11; Fredriksson, List & Millimet, supra note 90, at 1414.
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they utilize state-level abatement expenditures scaled by state
manufacturing output. The results indicate strong, positive effects of
neighboring environmental stringency on a state’s own environmental
stringency.301 Furthermore, Fredriksson and Millimet explore whether
the results are consistent with a race to the bottom or a race to the
top by allowing for asymmetric responses to neighboring policies.
Specifically, they allow for the possibility that states may respond
differently to changes in neighboring states depending on whether one
is currently more or less stringent than one’s neighbors. The results
are consistent with a race to the top as states are responsive only to
changes in neighboring policy if one is initially less stringent than
one’s neighbors.302
Several analyses have extended this work of Fredriksson and
Millimet in different directions. In a follow-up study, the same
authors test for a particular pattern of strategic interaction, referred
to as the “California effect.”303 Specifically, the authors test for the
presence of abnormally large spillovers from California’s
environmental policy choices to other states. The results do not
indicate a special role of California in the degree of cross-state
strategic interaction.304 Fredriksson, List, and Millimet extend the
previous models to allow for cross-policy strategic interactions.305 In
other words, in contrast to earlier models of strategic interaction, the
authors do not estimate a model that restricts the response of one
jurisdiction to policy changes in another jurisdiction to be limited to
the same policy (for example, a state need not respond to changes in
environmental regulation in neighboring states by only adjusting its
environmental regulation). Specifically, the authors estimate a model
that allows for the possibility that environmental, tax, and
301. Fredriksson & Millimet, supra note 299, at 114 (“[T]he elasticity of own
state environmental stringency with respect to current neighboring
environmental abatement costs is positive and significant to at least the
10% level of significance . . . .”).
302. Id. at 117 (“The fact that increases in relative abatement costs have
larger effects on the own state if neighbors initially have relatively
stricter environmental standards implies that states are ‘pulled’ to
stricter levels by improvements in relatively clean states (where
marginal abatement costs may be the greatest).”).
303. Per G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Is There a “California Effect”
in US Environmental Policymaking?, 32 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ.
737 (2002).
304. Id. at 740 (“[W]hile states are generally engaged in strategic
environmental policymaking, we find at best a minor overall
environmental leadership role for California.”).
305. Per G. Fredriksson, John A. List & Daniel L. Millimet, Chasing the
Smokestack: Strategic Policymaking with Multiple Instruments, 34
Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 387 (2004).
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expenditure policies are jointly determined and thus any policy may
respond to changes in neighboring states. Environmental regulation is
measured as in the prior studies. Tax policy is measured using data
on tax effort obtained from the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations. And expenditures are measured using
data on total general expenditures obtained from the Compendium of
State Government Finances. The results provide strong evidence of
not only cross-state strategic interactions within policy arenas, but
also across arenas.306 This is consistent with the empirical fact that
states utilize a package of incentives in an attempt to attract capital.
Levinson extends this work in an interesting direction. First, he
combines the spatial models of strategic interaction with the natural
experiment concerning President Reagan’s decentralization to see if
cross-state strategic interaction accelerated during the Reagan era.307
He finds little meaningful evidence that the extent of strategic policy
making changed after 1981; states act strategically in both periods.308
Second, Levinson tests for the presence of strategic interaction in the
setting of hazardous waste disposal tax rates across states over the
period from 1989 to 1995.309 He finds strong evidence of strategic
interaction beginning in 1992, after the Supreme Court ruled that
states are not able to levy different rates depending on whether the
waste originated instate or out-of-state.310
Several studies test for cross-state strategic interaction using
measures of environmental enforcement. Woods examines state
enforcement of environmental regulation in the surface-mining
industry.311 Enforcement is measured using the number of violations
306. See id. at 408 (“Our findings are consistent with the notion that
reaction functions between policies have a nonzero slope. For example,
we find that states respond to increased governmental expenditure levels
of neighbors by lowering their own pollution standards.”).
307. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 98–100.
308. See id. at 100 (“After 1981, the coefficient on neighboring states’
regulations seems to decrease, suggesting that reaction functions got a
tiny bit less steep, though the coefficient estimate on the interaction
term is not statistically significant.”).
309. Id. at 100–02.
310. See id. at 102 (“The reaction functions look somewhat different,
however, when we compare them before and after the 1992 Supreme
Court decision prohibiting discriminatory taxation. One way to view
this is that before 1992 there was no particular reason to raise one’s own
disposal tax in response to a neighbor. Instead, states could simply raise
the tax they charge other states for disposal, while leaving disposal taxes
low for waste generated locally.”).
311. See Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental
Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 Soc. Sci. Q.
174 (2006).
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and cessation orders issued by a state in a year scaled by the number
of mines in the state. The data for the twenty-three states that had
primary enforcement authority for this industry are obtained from the
Office of Surface Mining Annual Report for the period between 1987
and 1999.312 The results, first and foremost, indicate the presence of
strategic interaction; state enforcement depends on how one’s own
past enforcement levels compare to one’s neighbors.313 However, the
results are counter to Fredriksson and Millimet in that states are
found to only respond to their neighbors if the neighbors are relatively
lax in terms of enforcement.314
A series of studies by Konisky use state-level data on inspections
and punitive actions taken under the CAA, CWA, and RCRA from
1985 to 2000.315 The data are obtained from the EPA’s Integrated
Database for Enforcement Analysis. In the first study, Konisky
affirms the primary result from prior studies; a ten percent increase in
neighboring enforcement activity leads to a five to fifteen percent
increase in a state’s own enforcement activity.316 In the second study,
Konisky extends the analysis by allowing for asymmetric responses
depending on whether or not a state is considered economically
susceptible. However, he finds that states are equally likely to engage
in strategic policy making regardless of their current level of economic
vulnerability.317
Professors Davies and Naughton utilize a similar econometric
framework but assess country-level decisions to ratify any of 110
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) containing explicit
environmental targets or requirements.318 The data contain 139
312. Id. at 180–83.
313. Id. at 185 (“[S]tate enforcement stringency declines significantly in
states in which the enforcement stringency exceeded their competitor’s
average during the previous year.”).
314. See id. at 184 (“[S]tates do not respond to the regulatory behavior of
competitor states when their average stringency is greater than the
state’s own.”).
315. See Konisky, supra note 264; Konisky, supra note 255.
316. Konisky, supra note 264, at 853–54 (“I find elasticities in the range of
about .5 to 1.5, which suggests that states respond to a 10% increase
(decrease) in their competitor states’ enforcement efforts with a 5% to
15% increase (decrease) in their own enforcement efforts.”).
317. See Konisky, supra note 255, at 416 (“[I]n none of the models is it the
case that states more susceptible to interstate economic competition are
more likely to respond to the regulatory enforcement behavior of
competitor states.”).
318. Ronald B. Davies & Helen T. Naughton, Cooperation in Environmental
Policy: A Spatial Approach, Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin., Apr. 27, 2013,
available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10797-0139280-1#.
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countries spanning the period from 1980 to 1999. The results provide
meaningful evidence of strategic interaction in environmental policy
making at the country level; a ten percent increase in the number of
treaties participated in by one’s neighbors raises one’s own
participation by about 1.5%.319 Furthermore, the analysis reveals that
this strategic interaction is driven by countries—OECD and nonOECD alike—reacting to ratifications by other OECD countries.320
This result is consistent with the asymmetric results in the initial
Fredriksson and Millimet study in that OECD countries are likely to
be more environmentally stringent on average.
Two final studies on strategic interaction in environmental policy
making merit attention. Engel and Konisky explore the possibility of
strategic policy making not by estimating a spatial econometric
model, but rather by directly surveying state environmental managers
in the United States.321 Engel surveyed eighty state environmental
regulators in 1996. Engel summarizes the findings: “[T]he possibility
that industry might relocate or site a new plant elsewhere is
something of a concern to the environmental regulators in many
states, and affects environmental policy making in some manner in
most states.”322 However, the survey responses do not yield much
guidance as to whether such strategic behavior is more in line with a
race to the bottom or race to the top.323
Konisky surveyed senior managers in state environmental agencies
in 2005. The survey was mailed to 1459 officials; the response rate
was roughly thirty-four percent. In contrast to Engel, the sample size
is larger and contains career managers rather than political
appointees.324 Several findings are noteworthy. First, only about ten
percent of the respondents indicated that they were “not sure” how
enforcement in their state ranked relative to other states.325 Second,
more than sixty percent responded that other states’ actions
influenced their own state’s actions; over ten percent indicated it has
a significant effect.326 Third, while more than seventy percent of the
319. See id. at 21 (“[W]e find positive and significant coefficients of
approximately 0.15.”).
320. Id. at 25 (“[T]reaty participation by OECD countries impacts that of
both OECD and non-OECD countries.”).
321. See Engel, supra note 64, at 337–47; David M. Konisky, Regulator
Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the Bottom Argument, 18 J.
Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 321, 325–26 (2007).
322. Engel, supra note 64, at 340–41.
323. See id. at 345.
324. Konisky, supra note 321, at 326.
325. Id. at 328 tbl.1.
326. Id. at 329.

1727

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·201
Environmental Federalism

respondents indicated their belief that environmental regulations are a
“fairly important” or “very important” factor in firm location
decisions, this ranked lower than their perceived importance of
transportation, labor costs and quality, proximity to customers or
markets, taxes, and proximity to natural resources or raw materials.327
That said, almost sixty percent responded that concerns over the
impact on industry played a “fairly important” or “very important”
role in the discouragement or opposition to adoption of a more
stringent environmental standard.328 More than twenty-five percent
said that concern over the impact on industry played a “fairly
important” or “very important” role in the decision to allow or
advocate allowing greater emissions or discharges.329
In sum, the evidence concerning the presence of strategic policy
making in the environmental arena is much stronger than the
evidence concerning the influence of environmental policy making on
firm location or industry competitiveness. One possible explanation
for this apparent contradiction is that politicians are not economically
rational. Engel discusses the possibility that “state regulators are
simply not aware of the evidence demonstrating the unimportance of
environmental standards to firm location.”330 However, she goes on to
argue that it is more plausible that “environmental regulators . . . are
responding to different incentives” as they are “subject to politically
rational, but not always economically rational, political pressures to
accommodate industry with the use of less stringent environmental
standards.”331 Consistent with the notion that politicians are
responding to political incentives, evidence indicates that states favor
uniform environmental standards. Engel writes:
[S]tates strive to mimic the standards of other states—activity
that is at least consistent with the hypothesis that states act
strategically when establishing environmental standards. On
average, environmental regulators agreed “strongly” with the
proposition that their state’s standards be of about the same
stringency as the standards of neighboring states.332

Thus, yardstick competition may be a more likely explanation for
strategic behavior than “economically irrational” resource
competition. Regardless of the source, the empirical evidence of

327. Id. at 331.
328. Id. at 334.
329. Id. at 333 tbl.4.
330. Engel, supra note 64, at 352.
331. Id. at 353.
332. Id. at 344 (citation omitted).
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strategic interaction in environmental policy making at the city, state,
and national level is convincing.
There is an additional issue regarding strategic policy making that
merits discussion. The preceding studies test for horizontal strategic
interaction in an environmental context. Here, horizontal refers to the
fact that the governments being examined are at the same level.
Vertical interactions, on the other hand, may arise due to fiscal
externalities spanning different levels of government when each
possesses some regulatory power over the same base.333 While
apparently unexplored in the environmental context, this issue is a
potentially salient one moving forward given increasing reliance on a
system of cooperative federalism in the United States and elsewhere.
For example, Esty discusses arrangements whereby the U.S. federal
government sets minimum standards and allows states the possibility
of exceeding these standards if desired.334 Professor Williams states:
“In recent years [cases in which state governments chose to override
federal environmental regulation with tighter regulations of their own]
have become more common, even for pollutants that have substantial
spillovers across states . . . .”335 In other situations, it may be that the
federal government sets standards related to some environmental
issues (for example, federal ambient air quality standards for criteria
pollutants), but states settle other environmental issues (for example,
hazardous waste disposal taxes).336 Thus, federal and state
governments can be seen as both taxing the same industrial base.
Professors Goulder and Stavins write: “The coexistence of state and
333. Specifically, externalities arise because each level of government fails to
account for the fact that its taxes reduce the size of the tax base
available to other levels. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 289–91.
334. See Esty, supra note 158, at 620–21 (“Centralized environmental
regulation, moreover, need not mandate fixed uniform standards. One
important alternative is minimum standards that provide a limited
common goal, ensuring that all parties meet a basic level of
environmental protection. For some jurisdictions, baseline standards
may be the most appropriate endpoint for their environmental programs
given their level of economic development and other specific
circumstances. In other jurisdictions, more stringent standards will be
appropriate given higher levels of available resources and greater public
demand for environmental protection. Under a system of minimum
standards, governments remain free to adopt a higher level of
environmental protection.”).
335. Roberton C. Williams III, Growing State-Federal Conflicts in
Environmental Policy: The Role of Market-Based Regulation, 96 J.
Pub. Econ. 1092, 1092 (2012).
336. Cf. James Alm & H. Spencer Banzhaf, Designing Economic Instruments
for the Environment in a Decentralized Fiscal System, 26 J. Econ.
Surv. 177, 182 (2012) (“[M]ultiple instruments are often used for a
single pollution problem in a single country.”).
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federal policies raises questions about their interactions. Problems
arise when state and federal policies overlap.”337
There seems to be no formal empirical evidence regarding the
nature of any strategic interactions between subnational and national
governments in the context of environmental policy.338 Thus, if there
is indeed a push for something akin to the cooperative federalism
described in Esty,339 this is an area in desperate need for both
theoretical and empirical research. However, as a starting point, there
are several studies looking at vertical policy interactions in
tax setting.
A series of studies examine the case of gasoline and cigarette
taxation in the United States. Professors Besley and Rosen utilize
data from 1975 to 1989.340 The results indicate that states increase
their gasoline and cigarette taxes by about three to four cents per
each ten cent increase in the corresponding federal tax rate.341
Professors Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano analyze data over the
period from 1977 to 1997.342 They obtain weaker results for cigarette
taxes, but continue to find a positive effect of federal gasoline tax
rates on state tax rates.343 However, Professors Fredriksson and
Mamun revisit the issue of cigarette taxation using data from 1975 to
2001.344 The authors find a meaningful effect. When focusing on data
337. Lawrence H. Goulder & Robert N. Stavins, Challenges from StateFederal Interactions in US Climate Change Policy, 101 Am. Econ.
Rev. 253, 257 (2011).
338. But see Chang, Sigman & Taub, supra note 287 (assessing federal
delegation of environmental authority to states under the CWA and
RCRA); W. Bowman Cutter & J.R. DeShazo, The Environmental
Consequences of Decentralizing the Decision to Decentralize, 53 J.
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 32 (2007) (examining the implementation of
authorization under the RCRA in California in the early 1990s and
determining that once cities received authorization to regulate
enforcement efforts increased but that it is unlikely that authorization of
other cities would result in the same increase).
339. See Esty, supra note 158, at 620–21.
340. See Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, Vertical Externalities in Tax
Setting: Evidence from Gasoline and Cigarettes, 70 J. Pub. Econ.
(1998).
341. See id. at 392.
342. See M.P. Devereux, B. Lockwood & M. Redoano, Horizontal and
Vertical Indirect Tax Competition: Theory and Some Evidence from the
USA, 91 J. Pub. Econ. 451 (2007).
343. See id. at 475 (“For gasoline . . . the federal tax plays a significant role,
indicating the presence of some vertical competition.”).
344. See Per G. Fredriksson & Khawaja A. Mamun, Vertical Externalities in
Cigarette Taxation: Do Tax Revenues Go Up in Smoke?, 64 J. Urb.
Econ. 35, 37–40 (2008).
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from 1982 to 2001, the results indicate that states reduce their taxes
by up to five cents per each ten cent increase in the federal tax rate.345
The authors attribute this difference to the additional years of data
from the Reagan era of new federalism, as well as the addition of
various independent variables to control for political economy issues.
Professor Goodspeed uses data across thirteen OECD countries
from 1975 to 1984 to test if local income tax rates are affected by
national income tax rates.346 Local tax rates are measured by total
local personal income tax revenue scaled by gross national product
(GNP). National tax rates are measured by total federal and state
income tax revenue scaled by GNP. Thus, states are lumped together
with the central government. He obtains a negative effect of national
tax rates on local tax rates; the estimates imply an elasticity of about
-0.5.347
Professors Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé assessed the impact of
federal tax rates on state personal income and general sales taxes.348
The data covered the forty-one states with an income tax between
1987 and 1996. Tax rates were measured as state or federal income
tax revenue scaled by personal income. State tax rates were also
measured by the sum of state income and general sales tax scaled by
personal income. The results are consistent with the Besey and Rosen
study. Specifically, a ten percent increase in the federal tax rate leads
to about a one percent increase in state income tax rates and a two
percent increase in state income plus general sales tax rates.349
A final set of analyses is based on Canadian, Swedish, and Swiss
data. Professors Hayashi and Boadway focused on business taxation
in Canada and define the provincial business tax rate as corporate
income tax revenues scaled by corporate profits earned in the
345. See id. at 47 (“Our empirical results for the 1982/83–2001 time period
suggest the presence of a negative vertical externality between different
levels of government in the US. In particular, our evidence suggests that
an increase in the federal cigarette tax may reduce the average state
cigarette tax rate by 15 to 48 cents.”); id. at 42–43 (“Model VIII
suggests that states reduce their real cigarette tax rates by 48 cents per
real dollar increase in the federal tax rate.”).
346. See Timothy J. Goodspeed, Tax Structure in a Federation, 75 J. Pub.
Econ. 493 (2000).
347. See id. at 500 (“The point estimate for the most
specification . . . corresponds to an elasticity of about -0.5.”).

complete

348. See Álex Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, Vertical Income Tax
Externalities and Fiscal Interdependence: Evidence from the US, 31
Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 247 (2001).
349. See id. at 262 (“[T]here is a significant positive interdependence between
federal and state tax rates. A 1% point change in the federal tax burden
supposes an average variation in the income state tax rate around 0.10%
and of 0.22% in the combined state income plus sales tax rate.”).
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province.350 The federal rate is obtained similarly using federal
corporate income tax revenues. The data covered the period from
1963 to 1996. Contrary to the prior study on the United States, the
results indicate that provinces respond to higher federal tax rates by
substantially reducing their own rates.351 Professors Andersson,
Aronsson, and Wikström study local (municipality) and regional
(county) personal income tax rates in Sweden from 1981 to 1990.352
Again, the results indicate that local tax rates are reduced in response
to higher regional tax rates.353 Brülhart and Jametti examined local
(municipality) and regional (canton) tax rates in Switzerland in select
years spanning in the period from 1985 to 2001.354 Here, the results
indicated higher local tax rates in response to an increase in regional
tax rates.355
Thus, the empirical evidence appears to confirm the existence of
vertical tax externalities in federations. However, whether strategic
policy making leads to inefficiently high or low taxation is unclear and
may vary across locations and the type of tax considered.
Theoretically, the effects of vertical tax competition on efficiency have
been shown to depend crucially on the order of moves and the
political objectives of the different levels of government, which is the
subject of Part II.D. Wilson concludes: “Clearly, the best case for
efficiency will occur when the federal government is benevolent and is
able to move first, so that it can influence the behavior of the state
governments.”356 However, significant research is needed that
incorporates the peculiarities of cooperative federalism with regards to

350. See Masayoshi Hayashi & Robin Boadway, An Empirical Analysis of
Intergovernmental Tax Interaction: The Case of Business Income Taxes
in Canada, 34 Can. J. Econ. 481 (2001).
351. See id. at 501–02 (“[V]ertical responses of provincial taxes to

the federal tax are negative . . . .”).
352. See Linda Andersson, Thomas Aronsson & Magnus Wikström, Testing
for Vertical Fiscal Externalities, 11 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 243, 250–
52 (2004).
353. See id. at 256 (“[T]here is a negative relationship between the tax rates
chosen by the two levels of government.”).
354. See Marius Brülhart & Mario Jametti, Vertical Versus Horizontal Tax
Externalities: An Empirical Test, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 2027, 2042–45
(2006).
355. See id. at 2051 (“This suggests that the strategic complementarity of
municipal and cantonal tax rates is two-directional: municipalities on
average react to higher cantonal tax rates by raising their own tax rate,
and cantonal governments react to higher municipal tax rates by raising
the cantonal tax rate.”).
356. Wilson, supra note 8, at 290.
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environmental regulation into existing theoretical and empirical
models of vertical interactions.
D.

Political Economy

Both the Tiebout and interjurisdictional competition frameworks
make strong assumptions concerning the behavior of governments.
The Tiebout model assumes that communities adjust policies
optimally to attract (or repel) residents.357 The interjurisdictional
competition model assumes that governments maximize a known
social welfare function.358 In practice, there are several reasons why
decentralized policy makers may not behave in this fashion. First, as
posited in so-called Leviathan models of government behavior, policy
makers may seek to maximize the size of the local tax base rather
than social welfare. Second, lobbying behavior or explicit corruption
may induce policy makers to deviate from socially optimal policies.
Third, individuals may abstain from participation in the political
process. Fourth, policy makers may aim to maximize social welfare
but make mistakes. Mistakes may arise either due to imperfect
scientific knowledge or the so-called winner’s curse. A final reason, in
the context of the Tiebout model, for local governments possibly
deviating from the assumed behavior pertains to differential mobility
rates across population segments discussed in Part II.A. Thus, this
Part does not revisit that issue in its discussion.
Before discussing the empirical literatures with regard to these
issues, it is important to reiterate that what is relevant for the debate
over environmental federalism is not simply whether local policy
makers stray from socially optimal decisions, but rather how any such
deviations compare to political economy distortions at the
federal level.
1.

Leviathan

Leviathan models suppose that governments seek to maximize tax
revenues rather than social welfare.359 As such, tax rates (or, in this
case, any revenue-generating environmental instrument) are set
inefficiently high. Wilson notes that capital mobility limits the ability
of policy makers to behave in this manner; capital can move to avoid

357. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 17, at 1236 (“[C]ommunities below the
optimal size seek to attract new residents in order to lower the average
cost of providing services.”).
358. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1136 (“[P]ublic officials seek in their
decisions to maximize the welfare of their constituencies . . . .”).
359. See Wallace E. Oates, Searching for Leviathan: A Reply and Some
Further Reflections, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 578, 578 (1989); Wilson, supra
note 8, at 296.
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excessively high taxes.360 Because capital may be less mobile across
countries than within countries, the federal government may be more
capable of acting like a Leviathan. Thus, decentralization is predicted
to result in lower tax rates as rates move towards the efficient level.
However, Wilson goes on to state that if decentralized policy makers
behave strategically, as discussed in Part II.C.3, then capital mobility
may lead to a race to the bottom in which decentralized tax rates are
inefficiently low and less than what would be set by the federal
government.361 As a result, Leviathan and race to the bottom models
both predict that decentralized tax rates will be lower than those set
by the central government.362 In the former case, this reduction entails
a movement toward the socially optimal level, while the latter results
in a movement away from social optimality.
This theoretical result implies that obtaining empirical evidence
supporting or refuting the Leviathan model is difficult. One can
certainly assess the empirical associations between the relative power
of the top tier of government (referred to as “centralism”), the extent
of competition among lower tiers of government (referred to as
“fragmentation”), and policy outcomes.363 However, whether the
results support or refute the Leviathan model is unknown without
knowledge of the efficient tax rate.364 Evidence of smaller public
sectors in decentralized economies is consistent with, but not proof of,
the Leviathan model.
Aside from the difficulties arising from the inability to observe the
efficient level of taxation, the empirical literature must also confront
data issues surrounding the proper measurement of decentralization,
as well as the possible endogeneity of decentralization. In light of the
360. See Wilson, supra note 8, at 298 (“[C]apital mobility . . . is likely to
play a similar efficiency-enhancing role. In this case, government officials
will engage in expenditure competition by increasing those public inputs
that enhance the productivity of capital.”).
361. See id. (“[I]t is also possible that this competition for capital might
inefficiently distort the pattern of public expenditures away from
expenditures on public goods or inputs that do not enhance capital
productivity . . . .”).
362. See id. at 296 (“It is difficult to ascertain empirically whether the
welfare-improving or welfare-worsening view of tax competition is more
accurate, since both views seem to predict that an increase in the
number of competing governments should reduce the total size of
government.”)
363. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Zax, Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?,
79 Am. Econ. Rev. 560 (1989) (measuring the effects of the “two
distinct dimensions” of decentralization: centralism and fragmentation).
364. See id. at 566 (“The effects of increased centralism are consistent with
the monopoly predictions of Leviathan models. . . . Whether a local
government sector configured in this way would be ‘optimal’ remains, of
course, an open question.”).
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numerous difficulties testing the Leviathan model empirically, this
Article does not provide a detailed survey of the existing literature.
However, Oates provides an early survey.365 And Professors Crowley
and Sobel offer a recent addition to the literature and provide a more
current literature review.366 The authors state that the “previous
literature has examined local, state, and international data and has
found mixed results.”367 Thus, whether the Leviathan model can be
empirically supported, particularly in the context of environmental
issues, is an open question.
2.

Lobbying and Corruption

Aside from government preferences as to tax revenues, policies
may also deviate from socially optimal levels due to lobbying
influence or corruption. Esty concludes that there exists no evidence
on the relative size of special interest distortions at the local versus
federal levels.368 Revesz counters the notion that environmental
interest groups are stronger at the federal level and hypothesizes that
the reverse may be true because of the typical grass-roots nature of
environmental groups.369 Professors Fredriksson and Gaston posit a
theoretical model where capital has no incentive to lobby at the local
level if it is mobile; it can simply relocate if policies are not to its
liking.370 Thus, environmental lobbying is offset by capital mobility,
not industry lobbying, at the local level. However, with centralized
policy making, both environmental and industry groups have an

365. See Oates, supra note 359.
366. See George R. Crowley & Russell S. Sobel, Does Fiscal Decentralization
Constrain Leviathan? New Evidence from Local Property Tax
Competition, 149 Pub. Choice 5 (2011).
367. Id. at 6.
368. See Esty, supra note 158, at 649–50 (“[E]nvironmental decisionmaking is
particularly susceptible to special interest distortion. Rent-seeking
behavior undoubtedly affects national as well as state environmental
policymaking, but there is no evidence that public decisionmaking is
systematically more distorted at the federal than at state and local
levels. Indeed, given general popular indifference to many state and local
environmental decisions, as well as greater media attention to federallevel activities, one might suggest precisely the opposite.” (citations
omitted)).
369. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Choice Analysis, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 568–71 (2001).
370. See Per G. Fredriksson & Noel Gaston, Environmental Governance in
Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups,
38 Econ. Inquiry 501, 508 (2000) (“[C]apital owners are unlikely to
engage in costly lobbying activities if they can move . . . .”).
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incentive to lobby (if capital is not perfectly mobile across national
borders).371
In terms of corruption, theoretical arguments are also ambiguous.
For example, Professor Weingast argues that decentralization limits
corruption through interjurisdictional competition.372 However,
Professors Shleifer and Vishny hypothesize that access to the same
bribe base (as opposed to tax base) may result in greater levels of
corruption.373 Notably, Shleifer and Vishny’s argument does not make
the case for greater corruption at the federal or local level, but rather
it indicates that the system of simultaneous policy making itself
results in greater corruption.
The empirical evidence on lobbying and corruption is equally as
mixed in the findings as the theoretical arguments. To begin the
review of the empirical evidence, one strand of the literature addresses
this issue indirectly by examining specific policy examples to ascertain
whether the outcome was influenced by political motives. Two such
studies examine particular instances of EPA behavior; thus, the
findings shed some light on political influences within federal
environmental decision making.
In the first of these studies, Professor Hird examines EPA outlays
under Superfund.374 Under the program, abandoned hazardous waste
sites are evaluated and given a Hazard Ranking System (HRS) score.
If the HRS score exceeds a certain threshold, the site is added to the
National Priorities List (NPL). Hird obtains data on 799 sites on the
NPL as of December 31, 1988, from the Superfund data collection
system (CERCLIS). He examines determinants of the number of NPL
371. See id. (“[T]he immobility which leaves capital exposed to stricter
regulation of its production may be offset by a ‘lobbying effect’ that
creates increased political pressure for more lenient regulation.”).
372. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 1, 6 (1995) (“Federalism thus greatly diminishes the
level and pervasiveness of economic rent-seeking and the formation of
distributional coalitions. Competition among the lower units limits the
success from rent-seeking.”); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. Econ. 599, 610 (1993) (“[C]ompetition
between bureaucrats in the provision of government goods . . . will drive
bribes down to zero.”).
373. See Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 372, at 615 (“[T]he weakness of
central government, which allows various governmental agencies and
bureaucracies to impose independent bribes on private agents seeking
complementary permits from these agencies. When the entry of these
agencies into regulation is free, they will drive the cumulative bribe
burden on private agents to infinity.”).
374. See John A. Hird, Superfund Expenditures and Cleanup Priorities:
Distributive Politics or the Public Interest?, 9 J. Pol’y Analysis &
Mgmt. 455 (1990).
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sites per state, the length of time spanned between when a site was
initially proposed and when its status became final, total expenditures
on a site as of 1988, and planned future expenditures by the EPA on
a site.375 The empirical model assesses whether political variables
related to the committee assignments of a state’s U.S. senators and
representatives influence these allocation outcomes after controlling
for other attributes of a site such as its HRS score. The results
indicate that having senators or representatives from a state on key
Senate and House subcommittees may influence the total number of
sites on the NPL in a given state and how quickly a site progresses
to final status.376 However, these political variables have no
meaningful influence on the level of current or future expenditures at
a given site.377
The second of these studies is by Cropper, Evans, Berardi, DuclaSoares, and Portney, who analyze EPA decisions concerning cancercausing pesticides between 1975 and 1989.378 Under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the EPA was
required to reregister the 600 active ingredients appearing in various
pesticides. If the ingredient was found to pose a significant risk to
humans or animals, the EPA was to conduct a special review to weigh
the benefits and costs of the reregistration of the ingredient.379 Over
the time period studied, a special review was completed for thirtyseven ingredients. Of these, nineteen involved ingredients used to
treat food crops and found to cause cancer in laboratory animals. For
each of these ingredients, the EPA made separate decisions for each
type of crop to which it is applied. In total, 245 ingredient-crop
combinations were decided upon by special review; ninety-six were
banned.380 Controlling for cancer risk as well as economic importance,
the authors assess whether public comments submitted to the EPA
during the review process by environmental groups, industry groups,
and academics affected the outcome. The results do indicate that the
cancellation decisions were affected by the existence of public
comments by each of the three groups; comments by environmental
groups raised the probability of cancellation, while the existence of
comments by industry groups and academics lowered the cancellation
375. Id. at 469–71.
376. See id. at 477–78.
377. See id. at 477.
378. See Maureen L. Cropper, William N. Evans, Stephen J. Berardi, Maria
M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, The Determinants of Pesticide
Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100 J. Pol.
Econ. 175 (1992).
379. Id. at 178–79.
380. Id. at 179, 180 tbl.1.
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probability.381 While the magnitude of the effect of environmental
groups was larger than the corresponding effect of industry groups,
the combined effect of industry groups and academics was greater.382
A similar strand of studies has undertaken analyses at the state
level. Professors Hays, Esler, and Hays examine cross-state variation
in the Green Policy Index, which is a function of the existence of fifty
different environment-related policies and the extent of commitment
to seventeen environmental programs common to all states.383 The
index is computed based on data from 1987 to 1991. Among the
various determinants of the index considered, the authors include a
measure of environmental pressure—state membership in
environmental groups as a fraction of the population—and industry
pressure—fraction of state employment in the manufacturing sector.
Surprisingly, the results indicate a positive association between both
environmental and industry pressure and the index.384 The latter
could represent a failure of the statistical analysis to identify the
causal effect of industry pressure on environmental policy.
Professor Helland uses data from the EPA’s Performance
Compliance Database to assess inspections, violations, and effluent
discharge at 232 pulp and paper mills across thirty states under the
CWA from 1989 to 1993.385 Enforcement of the CWA is either the
responsibility of regional offices of the federal EPA or the
responsibility of the states; seventy percent of the sample is under
state control.386 With the set of potential determinants of inspections,
violations, and effluent discharges, the authors include local
environmental pressure (measured by the share of the state
population belonging to the Sierra Club) and economic pressure
(measured by the size of the plant and the local unemployment rate).
381. See id. at 194 (“[I]intervention in the regulatory process—by both
business and environmental groups—affects the likelihood of pesticide
use restrictions.”).
382. Id. at 194–95 (“All other things being equal, interventions by
environmental groups have about twice the impact on the likelihood of
cancellation as those by growers (although the combined effect of
growers and academic commenters, who weigh in against cancellations,
outweighs that of environmentalists).”).
383. See Scott P. Hays, Michael Esler, & Carol E. Hays, Environmental
Commitment among the States: Integrating Alternative Approaches to
State Environmental Policy, 26 Publius: J. Federalism 41 (1996).
384. See id. at 53 (“[E]nvironmental commitment is a function of pressure for
greater commitment from both environmental groups and
manufacturing interests . . . .”).
385. See Eric Helland, Environmental Protection in the Federalist System:
The Political Economy of NPDES Inspections, 36 Econ. Inquiry 305
(1998).
386. Id. at 312 tbl.II.

1738

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·201
Environmental Federalism

The results indicate state responsibility for enforcement is associated
with a lower probability of inspection and higher effluent discharge.387
Greater environmental pressure is associated with a higher probability
of a plant being inspected, lower probability of a plant being in
violation, and lower effluent discharge.388 Plant size, particularly in
areas of high unemployment, is associated with a lower probability of
a plant being inspected and a higher probability of a plant being in
violation.389
Joskow and Schmalensee investigate the role of politics in the SO2
tradable allowances program created by Congress in 1990390 to combat
acid rain.391 Specifically, the authors investigate whether political
variables help explain the allocation of allowances across electric
utilities. The outcome examined is the difference between the actual
allowances allocated to a given utility and the expected allocation
derived under different objective allocation rules. Political variables
considered include measures of the political clout of the state in which
the utility belongs (for example, whether it is considered a swing
state, whether it has a competitive Senate or gubernatorial election,
and its number of electoral votes) and the committee assignments of
its U.S. senators and representatives.392 The authors find some
evidence that states with greater political clout fared better in terms
of allocations.393 That said, Joskow and Schmalensee conclude: “If
anything, the resulting allocation of Phase II allowances appears more
to be a majoritarian equilibrium than one heavily weighted toward a
narrowly defined set of economic or geographical interests. It is not
strongly consistent with the predictions of standard models of interest
group politics or of congressional control.”394
387. Id. at 315 tbl.III.
388. See id. at 311–12.
389. See id. at 313 (noting that “as the unemployment rate rises, larger
employers are inspected less frequently,” but these circumstances
“increase[] the probability of a violation”).
390. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7651) (amending the Clean Air Act).
391. See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of
Market‐Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41
J.L. & Econ. 37 (1998).
392. Id. at 74.
393. See id. at 79 (“[T]here is strong evidence that states with political
‘clout’—because they were large states that were swing states in the
1988 presidential election, or because they were large states that
happened to have competitive gubernatorial campaigns in 1990, or
because they had representatives in the House Energy and Commerce
leadership—tended to do well in Phase II, and weak evidence that they
also did well in Phase I, all else equal.”).
394. Id. at 81.
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Another strand of the literature explicitly investigates the link
between (fiscal) decentralization and corruption. As is the case in the
empirical literature testing the Leviathan model, studies in this area
must confront data issues surrounding the proper measurement of
decentralization, the potential endogeneity of decentralization, as well
as the proper measurement of corruption.
Several studies use cross-country data and measure federalism
using a discrete measure of federal structure. Professor Treisman
analyzes country-level data on perceived corruption obtained from
Transparency International (TI) from 1996 to 1998.395 The index is
based on a combination of surveys of businesses, local populations,
economic risk analysts, and country experts. Federalism is measured
using a simply binary indicator. The number of countries covered
varies by year, ranging from fifty-two in 1997 to eighty-five in 1998.396
The results indicate that federal structures have a meaningful,
positive association with corruption holding constant the level of
economic development and democratic history of a country.397
Professors Gerring and Thacker investigate corruption across 125
countries using a measure developed elsewhere that combines several
sources of data from the late 1990s.398 Federalism is measured on a
three-point scale (non-federal, semi-federal, and federal). The results
are in line with those found by Treisman, indicating a positive
association between federalism and corruption.399 Interpreting the
findings as causal, the results suggest that moving from a federal to a
unitary system would decrease corruption. For example, Nigeria
would fall from the seventh most corrupt country to number forty-six
and the United States from the 108th most corrupt country to
number 119.400 The authors conclude:
[N]ational bureaucracies are large and interdepartmental
transfers tend to be frequent. It is more difficult to maintain
clientelistic networks under such circumstances. . . . Following
Madison, largeness of size and heterogeneity of constituency
395. See Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National
Study, 76 J. Pub. Econ. 399, 407–14 (2000).
396. See id. at 410.
397. See id. at 430 (“[A] state that was federal tended to rank from about
half a point to more than one point higher on the corruption scale than
a similar state that was unitary.”).
398. See John Gerring & Strom C. Thacker, Political Institutions and
Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism, 34 British J.
Pol. Sci. 295 (2004).
399. See id. at 310 (“[T]he findings are strong: unitarism and parliamentarism mitigate political corruption.”).
400. Id. at 326.
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may be seen as conducive to more transparency, more publicity
and more anti-corruption efforts generally, at least in so far as
these may stem from the dynamics of political competition.401

Bohara, Mitchell, and Mittendorff analyze corruption across roughly
ninety countries using the World Bank Institute Governance Research
Indicator to measure corruption in 1996, 1998, and 2000.402 Federalism
is measured using a simply binary indicator. Contrary to the results of
Gerring and Thacker, this analysis found no statistically meaningful
association between federalism and corruption.403
Other studies in the literature utilize continuous measures of
decentralization to reflect the degree to which countries are
decentralized in practice. Fisman and Gatti analyze corruption across
fifty-nine countries.404 Corruption is measured using an index provided
by the International Country Risk Guide. Decentralization is
measured as the subnational share of total government spending
obtained from the International Monetary Fund. The data are
averaged over the years available from the period between 1980 and
1995.405 In contrast to the study by Treisman, the authors find a
meaningful, negative association between fiscal decentralization
and corruption.406
Professor Gulsun Arikan uses corruption data from TI for about
forty countries in 1998 along with several measures of fiscal
decenteralization: per capita number of local jurisdictions, per capita
number of local and intermediate jurisdictions, share of subnational
government employment, and the share of subnational government
expenditures.407 The results suggest a negative—but only weakly
statistically significant—association between decentralization and
corruption.408 The author concludes: “The empirical results are not
401. Id. at 319.
402. See Alok K. Bohara, Neil J. Mitchell & Carl F. Mittendorff, Compound
Democracy and the Control of Corruption: A Cross-Country
Investigation, 32 Pol’y Stud. J. 481 (2004).
403. See id. at 493 (“[T]he relationship between federalism and corruption is
significant in only one of the 16 models”).
404. See Raymond Fisman & Roberta Gatti, Decentralization and
Corruption: Evidence Across Countries, 83 J. Pub. Econ. 325 (2002).
405. Id. at 329–31.
406. See id. at 326.
407. See G. Gulsun Arikan, Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for
Corruption?, 11 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 175 (2004).
408. See id. at 188 (“[A]ll of the estimated decentralization coefficients are
positive, indicating (as expected) that greater decentralization reduces
corruption. . . . Despite this favorable sign pattern, however, only four
out of the first eight decentralization coefficients are significantly
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particularly strong, but they offer tantalizing evidence that corruption
may indeed be lower in countries where the extent of fiscal
decentralization is high.”409
Professors Fan, Lin, and Treisman investigate the same issues,
except they use firm-level data.410 The World Business Environment
Survey interviewed business managers from over 9000 firms across
eighty countries between 1999 and 2000. Managers were asked about
the frequency and amount of bribes paid. The primary measure of
decentralization used captures the number of tiers of government
within a country.411 The results indicate a meaningful association
between this measure of decentralization and the frequency and
amount of bribes.412 For example, adding an additional tier of
government is associated with a 2.6% increase in the probability that
a manager reports “‘always needing to make informal payments to get
things done.’”413 In addition, the subnational share of government
employment is positively associated with the frequency and amount of
bribes.414 Interestingly, the association between government tiers and
the frequency of bribes is only statistically meaningful for less
developed countries once the sample is split by level of development.
However, subnational share of government employment remains
positively associated with corruption in both subsamples.415 Thus, the
lack of association between government tiers and corruption among
developed countries may reflect a lack of variation in this subsample.
Lastly, a series of studies investigate two complementary
questions. Analyses by Fisman and Gatti and Professors Brollo,
Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini explore a different type of
relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption.
Specifically, each assesses the impact of federal transfers on the
behavior of subnational governments. Fisman and Gatti utilize statelevel data from the United States to investigate whether greater
federal transfers—yielding a divergence between state-level revenue
generation and expenditures—result in greater corruption by state
different from zero, with three of these instances showing significance at
just the 10 percent level.”).
409. Id. at 192.
410. See C. Simon Fan, Chen Lin & Daniel Treisman, Political
Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from Around the World, 93
J. Pub. Econ. 14 (2009).
411. Id. at 20–23.
412. See id. at 24.
413. Id.
414. See id. at 29 (“[A] larger share of public employment at subnational
levels was significantly associated with more frequent bribery . . .”).
415. See id. at 30.
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officials.416 Federal transfers are interpreted as inducing a “soft budget
constraint” at the state level.417 Data on state-level corruption comes
from the Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the
Public Integrity Section for 1987 and measures the annual number of
public officials (from any level of government) convicted in a state for
abuse of public office between 1976 and 1987. This is then scaled by
population or public sector employment in the state. The fiscal
variable of interest is the share of state and local expenditures
financed by federal transfers.418 The results indicate a meaningful,
positive association between the softness of the state budget
constraint and corruption.419
Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini exploit discontinuities in
the size of transfers from the federal government to municipalities in
Brazil arising from deterministic allocation rules related to
municipality population.420 Using data from between 2001 and 2008,
the authors assess the impact of transfers in non-election years on
local corruption and the quality of individuals seeking local office,
such as the office of a municipal mayor. Corruption is measured using
municipal audit reports prepared by an independent body, the
Corregedoria Geral da União, under Brazil’s anti-corruption program.
Candidate quality is measured by education.421 The results indicate
that a ten percent increase in transfers results in at least a six percent
increase in corruption, a seven percent increase in the probability of
an incumbent being reelected, and a six percent reduction in the
college graduation rates of an incumbent’s opponents.422

416. See Raymond Fisman & Roberta Gatti, Decentralization and
Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs, 113 Pub.
Choice 25 (2002).
417. Id. at 26–27.
418. Id. at 27–29.
419. See id. at 33 (“Consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of
hardness of budget constraints, we find that the rate of prosecutions for
abuse of public office is greater in states with higher rates of federal
transfers.”).
420. See Fernanda Brollo, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti & Guido
Tabellini, The Political Resource Curse, 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 1759
(2013).
421. Id. at 1769–77.
422. See id. at 1794 (“In particular, a 10 percent increase in the federal
transfers to municipal governments raises local corruption by 6 percent
(broad definition, possibly including bad administration) or by 16
percent (narrow definition, with only severe violation episodes).
Moreover, this fiscal windfall increases the incumbent mayor’s
probability of reelection by 7 percent, and shrinks the fraction of his
opponents with a college degree by 6 percent.”).
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Professors Fredriksson and Vollebergh assemble data from eleven
industrial sectors across twelve OECD countries over the period from
1982 to 1996.423 Instead of assessing the impact of decentralization on
the level of corruption, the authors explore whether a given level of
corruption has a larger impact on environmental policy in
decentralized countries. Environmental policy is measured at the
sector level within each country and is proxied by the aggregate
physical energy units used per unit of value added. Corruption is
measured using data from TI. The findings indicate a positive
association between corruption and energy intensity (environmental
laxity) in unitary countries.424 There is no meaningful association
between corruption and energy intensity with federal structures.425
The authors attribute this finding to the fact that corrupt political
officials have less power to influence policy outcomes in decentralized
systems.426
In sum, the empirical literature on lobbying and corruption in
federal systems is inconclusive for a few reasons. First, the difficulty
of dealing with the potential endogeneity of the presence of a federal
structure or the level of fiscal decentralization makes it unlikely that
the results discussed here have a causal interpretation. Second, from
the perspective of environment federalism, the debate is not over the
choice between a federal and a unitary system. Unfortunately, studies
using binary measures indicating a federal structure or a continuous
measure of the number of government tiers offer little guidance on
whether the federal or local level is responsible (or both) for the
positive association between corruption and non-unitary systems.
Finally, while studies assessing continuous measures of fiscal
decentralization—such as the share of subnational government
expenditures—are more helpful, the results are mixed and seem to
depend on characteristics of the budget at the local level.

423. See Per G. Fredriksson & Herman R.J. Vollebergh, Corruption,
Federalism, and Policy Formation in the OECD: The Case of Energy
Policy, 140 Pub. Choice 205 (2009).
424. See id. at 217 (“[G]reater government corruption leads to weaker energy
policy standards, but the effect is conditional on whether the country is
a federal system or not. The effect of corruption is reduced in federal
systems.”).
425. See id. at 213.
426. See id. at 217 (“The intuition is that the greater the number of political
units (veto players) involved in determining policy (in a federal system),
ceteris paribus, the larger the number of bribes paid by lobby groups,
and the more expensive it becomes for these groups to influence policy
through influence-seeking. The bribe offer to each political unit declines,
and the environmental/energy policy becomes more stringent.”).
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3.

Political Participation

Besides the potential for decentralization to affect the level of
lobbying or corrupt activity, it also has the potential to affect
individual participation in the political process. Decentralized policy
making is often advocated on the grounds that individual
participation is greater at the local level. Oates summarizes this view:
“The basic presumption here is that more decentralized political
systems are conducive to increase citizen impact on political outcomes
and political participation.”427 Bednar similarly states: “Democratic
outcomes improve with higher participation, and participation is
boosted when one’s vote is likely to be pivotal, which is more likely in
smaller-scale elections . . . .”428 However, a trade-off may exist if
participation leads to policies that are not socially efficient when the
electorate is relatively uninformed.429
In the interest of relative brevity, this Article does not conduct a
thorough review of the empirical literature—located predominantly
within the political science field—on political participation. Rather,
this Author refers the interested reader to Professor Horiuchi, who
provides an excellent review.430 Specifically, Horiuchi begins by stating
that American and European political scientists claim, contrary to the
statements above, that subnational elections have lower voter turnout
than national elections in most democracies.431 However, the author
goes on to state that the opposite is true in select countries such as
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, India, Italy, Northern Ireland,
Spain, and Switzerland.432 Horiuchi posits that political participation
depends on the likelihood that one’s vote affects the electoral outcome
and the ability of the electoral outcome to influence policy decisions.433
Thus, even if it is the case that subnational political participation is
lower in many democracies, this might change with greater
decentralization as local policy makers become more influential. That
427. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1138.
428. See Bednar, supra note 1, at 274–75.
429. See Esty, supra note 158, at 649 (“In fact, the technical complexity of
the regulatory process and the need to put competing values on a
commensurate basis makes environmental decisionmaking especially
obscure to the average citizen.”).
430. Yusaku Horiuchi, Turnout Twist: Higher Voter Turnout in Lower-Level
Elections (June 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8240.
431. Id. at 12.
432. Id. at 15.
433. See id. at 16 (“I hypothesize that the relative level of voter turnout in
subnational vs. national elections is a function of not only how much is
at stake but also how much citizens’ votes count in elections.”).
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said, devolution of environmental policy making alone may be
insufficient to affect political participation decisions at the local level.
4.

Knowledge

The final political economy issue that may impact a government’s
implementation of social welfare–maximizing policies concerns
knowledge. In the absence of any other distortions, the ability of any
government to maximize social welfare rests first and foremost with
the government’s knowledge of the true social welfare function. There
are at least two reasons why, in the context of environmental
federalism, governments may inadvertently maximize the wrong social
welfare function. First, the scientific basis of the social welfare
function (for example, the so-called damage functions for different
environmental hazards) may be incorrect. Second, governments may
overvalue the acquisition of capital due to the so-called winner’s
curse.
There is little empirical research related to environmental
federalism and scientific knowledge. However, due to potential
economies of scale and the incentive for jurisdictions to free ride,
many advocate that scientific research be centralized regardless of the
extent of decentralization of actual policy making. For example, Esty
states: “Sound environmental policies depend on good science, which,
in turn, requires a level of investment in sophisticated technical
analysis that many smaller jurisdictions are in no position to make.”434
On the other hand, Adler espouses concern that the “overcentralization of scientific research may increase the risks of political
manipulation of science.”435 Future work into the objectivity of
scientific research conducted at various levels of government appears
warranted. Moreover, it may be fruitful to consider a decentralized
system of scientific research that overcomes the incentive to free ride
through the creation of something akin to a patent system. For
example, in the context of policy innovation (discussed in Part II.E),
Rose-Ackerman states:
However, there is a more innovative way to encourage low-level
governments to search for new ways of doing things. The central
government might institute a system of prizes awarded to
governments after they have come up with new ideas. Prizes
could be a function of a jurisdiction’s own activities or could be
awarded only if the jurisdiction happened to generate the
best project.436
434. Esty, supra note 158, at 573.
435. Adler, supra note 9, at 147.
436. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593, 615–16 (1980).

1746

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·201
Environmental Federalism

There is also little empirical research related to environmental
federalism and the so-called winner’s curse.437 The winner’s curse
refers to the fact that when multiple agents bid for a single good with
an uncertain value based on unbiased, agent-specific forecasts of the
good’s true value, the agent with the highest bid frequently ends up
disappointed either because the bid exceeds the value of the good
(resulting in a net loss) or because the value is less than presumed
(resulting in a smaller net gain than envisioned).
The winner’s curse is relevant to the environmental federalism
debate because it suggests that in the presence of multiple
jurisdictions bidding for mobile capital (through environmental
standard setting) in order to maximize social welfare, the winning
jurisdiction may set the environmental standard too low and suffer
from the winner’s curse.438 As such, decentralized policy making,
resulting in multiple jurisdictions competing for mobile, lumpy capital
investments, may induce inefficiently low environmental standards
even if all jurisdictions seek to maximize social welfare and have
unbiased forecasts concerning the social value of attracting capital.
Much of the empirical evidence in support of the winner’s curse is
obtained by laboratory experiments conducted by economists. Some
behaviors in the field have also been shown to be consistent with the
winner’s curse.439 In sum, there is ample evidence that the winner’s
curse is a frequent outcome not only in the laboratory, but also in
practice. While fully rational agents should be able to eliminate the
winner’s curse, the evidence suggests that agents possess only
“bounded rationality” and do not recognize the difference between the
unconditional expected value of the good and the expected value of
the good conditional on submitting the highest bid.440
The potential for the winner’s curse to apply to jurisdictional
bidding for capital is very real. Engel states: “To entice new plants
within their borders, or to prevent their existing plants from leaving,
states offer firms lucrative packages consisting of a dizzying array of
economic incentives.”441 That said, the only study to this Author’s
knowledge that relates directly to interjurisdictional competition for
437. But see Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse, 2 J. Econ.
Persp. 191 (1988) (providing an early overview of the topic).
438. See Esty, supra note 158, at 632 (citing Peter P. Swire, The Race to
Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. 67, 98 (1996)).
439. See Thaler, supra note 437; Gary Charness & Dan Levin, The Origin of
the Winner’s Curse: A Laboratory Study, 1 Am. Econ. J.:
Microeconomics 207 (2009).
440. Charness & Levin, supra note 439, at 228.
441. Engel, supra note 64, at 319.
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capital is by Professors Greenstone and Moretti.442 The authors utilize
data collected from various issues of Site Selection over the period
from 1982 to 1993. Each issue details the siting decision of so-called
million dollar plants. In particular, the winning county is listed along
with one or two runner-up counties.443 This enables Greenstone and
Moretti to compare the county that won the new plant to counties
that merited final consideration but ultimately lost out on the plant.
While the size of any inducements offered by the winning and losing
counties is not known, the authors examine relative changes in
property values across winners and losers to estimate the welfare
gains experienced by winning counties. The findings are that property
values increased by roughly 1.1% to 1.7%, indicating that winning
counties experienced a net gain due to the attraction of the plants.444
Thus, at least this study concludes that the stronger version of the
winner’s curse—the winner suffering a net reduction in welfare—does
not seem to characterize jurisdictional competition for large capital
investments.
In sum, there are numerous political economy issues that play a
role in the debate over environmental federalism. Unfortunately, the
empirical evidence is less clear than on other issues discussed in this
Article. Empirical studies of the Leviathan model suffer from the
empirical equivalence of Leviathan and interjurisdictional competition
models: both predict lower tax rates in decentralized settings.
Distinguishing between the two requires knowledge of the socially
efficient tax rate, which is not an easy task. Empirical studies of the
Leviathan model, as well as of the effects of decentralization on
lobbying and corruption, suffer from the proper measurement of
decentralization and difficulty in dealing with the potential
endogeneity of institutional arrangements. As such, the results of
existing studies should not be interpreted in a causal manner. Finally,
there is limited evidence on whether decentralization of environmental
policy making induces greater political participation and leads to
inefficient decisions due to the winner’s curse. Nor is there much
empirical evidence concerning the optimal structure regarding
scientific research.

442. See Michael Greenstone & Enrico Moretti, Bidding for Industrial Plants:
Does Winning a “Million Dollar Plant” Increase Welfare? (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9844, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9844.
443. Id. at 14, 33 tbl.1.
444. See id. at 27 (“The most reliable data suggest that there is a relative
trend break of 1.1–1.7% in property values.”).
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E.

Policy Instruments

The Tiebout and interjurisdictional competition frameworks
invoke assumptions concerning the ability of jurisdictions to
implement a “full range of needed tax and regulatory instruments” to
obtain efficient outcomes.445 Similarly, Dalmazzone states that
“governments must be . . . in conditions to avail themselves of the
best suited among expenditure, tax, and environmental policy
instruments.”446 Part II.E will briefly discuss two final issues—
laboratory and bottom-up federalism—factoring into the debate over
environmental federalism under this umbrella. Laboratory, or
horizontal, federalism refers to policy replication by other subnational
governments once one subnational government discovers a successful
policy. Bottom-up, or vertical, federalism refers to policy adoption by
the federal government after successful demonstration of the policy at
the subnational level.
1.

Laboratory Federalism

One of the virtues of decentralized policy making is the ability of
jurisdictions to experiment with new policies, thereby developing
potentially new and welfare-improving policy instruments.447 This
notion is commonly referred to as laboratory federalism. Oates states
that “a federal system may offer some real opportunities for
encouraging such experimentation and thereby promoting ‘technical
progress’ in public policy.”448 Adler refers to the ability of states to act
as “environmental ‘laboratories.’”449 Bednar writes that “subnational
governments” have the opportunity to become “laboratories of
democracy.”450 Of course, this notion dates back at least to Justice
Brandeis’s well-known statement: “It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”451
Direct empirical evidence on the value of experimentation in
decentralized settings is limited given the difficulty of question
445. See Oates, supra note 4, at 6.
446. Dalmazzone, supra note 249, at 467.
447. See generally William M. Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, Rethinking
Environmental Federalism in a Warming World, 3 Climate Change
Econ. 1 (2012) (providing an excellent introduction to many of the
issues).
448. Oates, supra note 16, at 1132.
449. Adler, supra note 9, at 137.
450. Bednar, supra note 1, at 273.
451. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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involved. There is much literature on the diffusion of policies across
jurisdictions, exemplified, in part, by the literature discussed in Part
II.C on horizontal and vertical externalities in policy making.
However, this does not shed much light on the development or
evaluation of experimental policies in decentralized versus centralized
settings. Thus, early explorations into this issue were entirely
theoretical.
The seminal study in this area is by Rose-Ackerman.452 She
explored the incentives that local politicians have to undertake risky
experimentation. Three conclusions are of interest. First, secure
incumbents have little incentive to experiment and risk undermining
their re-election prospects.453 Instead, they can choose to free ride off
experiments conducted elsewhere. Second, local politicians may have
an incentive to experiment even if their local position is secure if they
aspire to federal office and are credited by the electorate for
developing innovative local policies.454 Kostogiannis and Schwager
provide additional theoretical support for this point.455 Finally,
wasteful duplication of experiments at subnational levels may arise
due to a failure to coordinate among jurisdictions and the desire for
all politicians to implement the policy with the greatest chance
for success.456
Professor Strumpf focuses on the incentives for jurisdictions to
free ride.457 If innovative policies can be easily replicated, then there is
no advantage to being the first-mover unless there are political gains
of the type discussed by Rose-Ackerman. Strumpf states:
Because successful policy experiments are eventually emulated,
they have a public good component. Experiments benefit not
just the innovating government but also potential imitators, and
so local governments have an incentive to free-ride off their
neighbors. Alternatively, a central government should take this
452. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 436.
453. See id. at 614 (finding that “secure politicians chose low-risk projects”
due to “the relatively low level of electoral benefit associated with a
major success”).
454. See id. (“[F]ederalism may encourage innovation at lower levels . . . by
increasing the attractiveness of low-level elected office.”).
455. See Christos Kostogiannis & Robert Schwager, On the Incentives to
Experiment in Federations, 60 J. Urb. Econ. 484 (2006).
456. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 436, at 594 (“[P]oliticians’ choices will
depend upon their knowledge of other jurisdictions’ actions. If they
ignore other governments, wasteful duplication can occur. If they hope
to benefit from other governments’ activities, few risky projects may be
undertaken.”).
457. See Koleman S. Strumpf, Does Government Decentralization Increase
Policy Innovation?, 4 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 207 (2002).
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learning externality into account when it is deciding whether to
consider a policy experiment.458

Similarly, Professors Galle and Leahy write: “Innovations in
government produce positive externalities for other jurisdictions.
Theory therefore predicts that local government will tend to produce
a lower than optimal amount of innovation, as officials will prefer to
free ride on innovation by others.”459 That said, Strumpf assesses
conditions under which free riding is more likely to occur. He predicts
that the level of policy experimentation will be relatively greater
under centralization as the number of subnational jurisdictions
increases and as the similarity of these jurisdictions increases
(specifically, as the welfare effects of different policies become more
highly correlated across locations).460 Professors Callander and
Harstad expand on this point, documenting that jurisdictions may opt
for a less-than-ideal policy if this policy is less useful to other
jurisdictions, and that incentives to do so are greater when the
jurisdictions are similar.461
Interestingly, the potential for subnational free riding is often
used to justify centralization of scientific research, but is often
omitted in the environmental federalism literature when discussing
local policy innovation. On the one hand, Galle and Leahy state that
“any number of scholars of federalism routinely argue that
experimentation is a reason to favor decentralized government,
generally acknowledging [Rose-Ackerman] with a ‘but see’ footnote
and at most a few sentences of explanation.”462 On the other hand,
Dalmazzone writes that “the generation and diffusion” of scientific
research related to environmental problems is a “task that is generally
assigned, in theory as in the real world, to the central level of
government” as these are “activities that benefit everyone and that
tend to be subject to important economies of scale.”463 However, while
these positions may seem a bit contradictory at first glance, they may
458. Id. at 208.
459. Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 Emory L.J. 1333, 1333
(2009).
460. See Strumpf, supra note 457, at 208–09; see also Hongbin Cai & Daniel
Treisman, Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation, 4 Q.J.
Pol. Sci. 35 (2009) (examining similar issues theoretically while
allowing for centralized experimentation to entail non-uniform policies).
461. See Steven Callander & Bård Harstad, Experimentation in Federal
Systems 35 (Natl. Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 19601,
2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19601.
462. Galle & Leahy, supra note 459, at 1337.
463. Dalmazzone, supra note 249, at 464–65.
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not be inconsistent. Galle and Leahy argue that policies that are
transparent and cheap to copy are the most susceptible to free
riding.464 This may be a more apt description of scientific research
than subtle policy components of environmental regulation. Moreover,
local policy makers may be more likely to receive credit for policy
innovations than the advancement of scientific knowledge. Rabe notes
that state-led initiatives regarding climate change may be due to the
fact that “some states have consciously chosen to be ‘first movers,’
often taking bold steps with the explicit intent of trying to take
national leadership roles on climate policy.”465
In terms of empirical research, the questions that can be
addressed are a bit more limited as direct assessments of whether
centralization leads to more or less policy experimentation are difficult
to conceptualize. Professor Volden examines whether states emulate
successful policies implemented in other states.466 Emulation of
successful policies by other jurisdictions is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for policy experimentation to be a benefit to
decentralization. The author examines the specific case of the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) over the period from
1998 to 2001.467 Specifically, Volden looks at amendments to
particular aspects of each state’s CHIP program to see if these
changes are driven in part by the design of other states’ CHIP
programs that were successful in reducing the proportion of uninsured
children in poor households. The results indicate that states are more
likely to emulate design choices from states that achieved past

464. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 459, at 1346 (“If it is very costly to
implement domestically someone else’s experiment, if it is hard to
acquire information about that experiment, or if it is dubious whether
the experiment is relevant to anyone else, then the incentives for freeriding are obviously much lessened.”).
465. Barry G. Rabe, States on Steroids: The Intergovernmental Odyssey of
American Climate Policy, 25 Rev. Pol’y Res. 105, 107 (2008).
466. See Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in
the Children’s Health Insurance Program, 50 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294
(2006).
467. See id. at 299–301.
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success.468 However, this is only the case if these design choices do not
necessarily result in higher costs.469
Further studies provide anecdotal evidence in support of greater
policy experimentation at the subnational level in the United States
in the case of GHG reductions targets. Specifically, Professors Cale
and Reams note that seventeen states adopted GHG reduction targets
between 1998 and 2008 despite the federal government never ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol.470 Rabe documents that twenty-two states—
representing roughly half of the U.S. population—adopted at least
two of eight climate change policies over roughly this same
time period.471
In sum, the theoretical literature indicates that the relationship
between decentralization and policy experimentation is not
straightforward.472 Whether policy innovation is greater at the
468. See id. at 302 (“The Success variable captures whether State B was
especially effective in lowering its uninsured rate among poor children.
Its coefficient is positive and statistically different from zero. Its effect is
sizable. Dyads in which State B was successful have nearly a 20%
greater odds of State A abandoning its policy in favor of that in State
B, when compared to dyads in which State B was unsuccessful. This
provides strong initial support for the Emulation of Successes
Hypothesis.”).
469. See id. at 307 (“[T]he role of best practices is somewhat evident in all
three types of policy changes, although the coefficient on Success is
statistically distinct from zero only for less costly policy changes and for
those with mixed components.”).
470. See Tabitha M. Cale & Margaret A. Reams, Influences on Adoption of
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Among US States, 1998–2008, 3
Open J. Pol. Sci. 39, 41 (2013) (“The 17 states with GHG reduction
targets [by 2008] are listed in alphabetical order: Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont and Washington.”).
471. The eight policies include renewable electricity mandates or portfolio
standards, carbon taxes, renewable fuel mandates or equivalent
programs that mandate expanded use of biofuels, carbon cap-and-trade
programs, statewide emissions reduction targets, mandatory reporting of
carbon emissions, formal participation as a co-plaintiff in the 2007
Supreme Court case on carbon dioxide regulation, and adoption of the
carbon emission standards for vehicles enacted by California. Rabe,
supra note 465, at 109–10 (“Twenty-two states representing about onehalf of the American population have enacted two or more of these eight
climate policies, indicating a considerable degree of political support for
policy and formal engagement in climate policy adoption. A few of these
states, such as California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York,
have adopted as many as six or seven of them.”).
472. See Callander & Harstad, supra note 461, at 34 (“[T]he prominence of
policy experimentation in policy and popular discourse has not been
matched by development of a formal understanding of the underlying
phenomenon.”).
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subnational level depends on the level of fragmentation at the
subnational level, the degree of heterogeneity across jurisdictions, the
level of transparency and replicability of local policies, the incentives
of policy makers, and the extent to which politicians can claim credit
for successful policies. Goulder and Stavins state:
The case for state-level experimentation needs to be considered
carefully: why the laboratories should be at the state, rather
than national, level is not clear, and—in any event—there is
some question regarding whether state authorities will allow
their ‘laboratory’ to be closed after the experiment has been
completed and the information delivered.473

In light of this, it is not surprising that Galle and Leahy conclude
that “the question whether innovation adds to the allure of
decentralized government is a highly nuanced one, not to be resolved
in a footnote or an aside.”474 Unfortunately, empirical evidence on this
issue is limited and likely to remain so given the difficulty in
designing appropriate statistical tests of the underlying hypothesis.
2.

Bottom-Up Federalism

Another potential virtue of decentralization is the notion of
bottom-up federalism. Professors Shipan and Volden use this term to
denote vertical policy diffusion from lower to upper levels of
government.475 This question is distinct from the prior discussion of
vertical externalities in policy making as that literature focuses
exclusively, to the Author’s knowledge, on the effects of federal
policies on state choices.
Empirical evidence on the importance of bottom-up federalism is
extremely limited. Oates provides anecdotal evidence in the context of
the creation of a SO2 permit trading scheme in the United States.
He writes:
More recently, in the area of environmental policy, the
experience in a number of states with their own forms of
Emissions Trading was an important prelude to the adoption, in
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, of a national trading
program in sulfur allowances to address the problem of acid
rain. Without this experience in a number of states, I seriously
doubt that policy-makers would have been willing to introduce

473. Goulder & Stavins, supra note 337, at 256.
474. Galle & Leahy, supra note 459, at 1339.
475. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The
Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 825, 825 (2006) (defining bottom-up federalism as “bottom-up
diffusion of policies from local governments to states”).
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such a new and unfamiliar policy measure as tradeable emissions
rights on a national scale. More generally, since the dawn of the
nation, programs successfully developed at the state level have
often provided models for subsequent federal programs.476

More generally, Bednar suggests that “[s]ubnational involvement in
national policy making may also help to overcome bureaucratic
inertia.”477 Rabe states:
In many instances, early state policy engagement has provided
models that were ultimately embraced as national policy by the
federal government. This has been evident in a range of social
policy domains, including health care and education, and can
either result in federal preemption that obliterates earlier state
roles or a more collaborative system of shared governance.478

Shipan and Volden address this issue more formally by examining
state and local adoptions of antismoking laws in the United States
over the period from 1975 to 2000.479 Conceptually, the authors argue
that greater adoptions by cities within a state may spur state action
due to a snowball effect or it may reduce the likelihood of state action
due to a “pressure valve” effect.480 Data on state antismoking laws
comes from the State Cancer Legislative Database maintained by the
National Cancer Institute. Data on city-level laws comes from the
Local Tobacco Control Ordinance Database compiled by the
American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation. The results indicate no
meaningful effect of local laws on state propensity to adopt
antismoking laws on average. However, further analysis reveals that
local laws reduce the probability of state adoption in states with low
values of legislative professionalism and raise the probability in states
with high values.481

476. Oates, supra note 16, at 1132–33.
477. Bednar, supra note 1, at 273.
478. Rabe, supra note 465, at 106.
479. See Shipan & Volden, supra note 475, at 829–32.
480. See id. at 827–28.
481. See id. at 840 (“[L]ocal-to-state diffusion does exist, but . . . it depends
crucially on the political environment. Ignoring the role of legislative
professionalism and of interest groups produces evidence of neither a
snowball nor a pressure valve effect; instead, these effects
counterbalance each other and produce null results for the influence of
local laws.”).
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Conclusion
Theoretical models used to frame the environmental federalism
debate—based on the Tiebout and interjursidctional competition
models—highlight several issues that play a salient role in the
efficiency of decentralized environmental policy making: resource
mobility, preference heterogeneity, interjursidctional externalities,
political economy concerns, and policy instrument choice. The
objective of this Article has been to provide a reasonably thorough,
yet concise, survey of what we do and do not know, empirically
speaking, concerning these various issues. While a complete
accounting of the magnitudes of the “imperfections,” as suggested by
Oates in the Introduction,482 is beyond the scope of the current Article
(and perhaps any article), several preliminary conclusions can
be drawn.
First, environmental concerns play, at best, a small role in
explaining patterns of resource mobility. Population mobility seems
relatively low in most developed countries and is declining in the
United States. Moreover, mobility seems to be driven predominantly
by economic, as opposed to environmental, factors. That said, there is
some evidence that environmental amenities may affect residential
location choices along the “spatial” margin (across very spatially
disaggregate neighborhoods). However, whether the lack of overall
population mobility reflects immobility or convergence to some spatial
equilibrium is unclear. Moreover, whether the threat of mobility is
sufficient to yield an efficient, market-like outcome—akin to
contestable markets—is also unclear. The impact of differential
mobility rates, particularly by education, on the efficiency of
decentralization is also unclear. Capital, while perhaps relatively more
mobile, appears to be influenced by environmental regulation only in
a few, highly pollution-intensive sectors. Other factors such as taxes
and endowments of physical and human capital seem to play more
important roles.
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that preferences over
environmental issues are heterogeneous, particularly across political
ideologies, income levels, and sectors of employment. However,
variation in preferences is much greater across countries than within
countries. Moreover, it is not clear that individuals sort themselves
across jurisdictions according to environmental preferences. Lastly,
there is no empirical evidence to support the (intuitive) notion that
subnational jurisdictions are better able to act on community
preferences than the central government.
Third, the empirical evidence concerning the importance of
interjursidictional externalities is compelling, particularly as it relates
482. See Oates, supra note 16, at 1136.
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to transboundary pollution and strategic policy making. The limited
but persuasive evidence on environment importing is also noteworthy.
One issue in this literature that gives this Author some pause is the
fact that externalities are less informative in understanding the spatial
distribution of enforcement than emissions and effluent discharge.
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that there exists limited evidence on
whether strategic policy making is due to a race to the top or a race
to the bottom.
Fourth, the empirical evidence regarding political economy issues
is less convincing and informative owing to limited data availability
and the difficulty of dealing with the endogeneity of decentralization.
Further empirical analysis is needed along several lines, such as the
efficacy of environmental and industry lobbying, the propensity for
policy makers to engage in corrupt activity, and political engagement
by the populous at different levels of government. Furthermore,
evidence regarding the empirical relevance of the winner’s curse in the
competition for capital and the optimal institutional structure for
promoting scientific research is required. Finally, significantly more
empirical investigation is needed to assess the arguments concerning
laboratory and bottom-up federalism in order to move these
arguments beyond mere speculation.
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